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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1954-1955"
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS
T HE BIG NEWS in the field of corporation law during the past
year was provided by the case of Wolfson v. Avery,' a case
which is noteworthy not only because of the law announced therein,
but also because of its impact on many large domestic corpora-
tions. In the subject case, the Illinois Supreme Court held Section
35 of the Business Corporation Act 2 to be in conflict with the State
Constitution.' This section authorized corporations having nine
or more directors to divide their directors into classes and stagger
the terms thereof in lieu of electing an entire board of directors
annually. The court took the position that this infringed upon
the cumulative voting provisions of the constitution in that it
tended to deny proportional minority representation on the board
of directors, though it did permit minority representation. It
* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past year,
but Is published rather for the purpose of calling attention to cases and develop-
ments believed significant and interesting. The period covered Is that of the
judicial year, embracing from 3 Ill. (2d) 116 to 6 Ill. (2d) 234; from 3 Ill. App.
(2d) 118 to 6 Ill. App. (2d) 325. Statutory changes of general Interest are also
noted.
16 11. (2d) 78, 126 N. E. (2d) 701 (1955). Hershey, J. filed a dissenting opinion.
This case, in both its trial and appellate stages, has been the subject of several law
review comments. See 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 822, 50 Northwestern L. Rev. 112,
43 Ill. B. J. 807, and 9 Miami L. Q. 365.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.35.
3 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 3.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
was admitted that exact proportional representation could not be
obtained, but the court seemed to feel that the constitution guar-
anteed it to the extent that it was possible. It should also be
pointed out that Section 35 had the effect of delaying proportional
representation, though this factor was not stressed.
In three cases, problems generated by, and peculiar to, small
closely held corporations arose to plague the Appellate Courts.
In two of these, the issue involved the authority of the President
to make contracts binding upon the corporation. In both cases,
the President lacked the express authority of the board of direc-
tors and the subject matter of the contract was not within the
powers normally incident to that office. Nevertheless, a contract
to pay an employee a fixed salary plus a percentage of the profits
was held to bind the corporation in the case of Jaffe v. Chicago
Warehouse Lumber Co.,4 where the President of the corporation
had, with the knowledge of the board of directors, arrogated its
authority and was in complete domination of the corporation.5
A contrary result was reached in Smith v. Shoreline Printers ,
Publishers,6 wherein a contract made by the President of a cor-
poration to subordinate the assignment of an account receivable
taken for security purposes was held not to bind the corporation.
The different result was predicated entirely upon the precise facts
of the case, the court being of the opinion that the President did
not dominate the corporation to the extent necessary to avoid the
general rule. In the other case in this category, that of Moss v.
Waytz, 7 the litigants, former partners, had incorporated their
business and, at the same time, entered into a contract among
themselves requiring, inter alia, unanimity of directors for cor-
porate action. Said contract was never incorporated into the
by-laws, and indeed a by-law of unknown origin required only a
majority vote of the directors. The Appellate Court for the
44 I1. App. (2d) 415, 124 N. E. (2d) 618 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
5 This exception to the general rule is not entirely new. For a similar case, see
Joy v. Ditto, Inc., 356 Ill. 348, 190 N. E. 671 (1934).
66 Ill. App. (2d) 290, 127 N. E. (2d) 677 (1955).
7 4 111. App. (2d) 296, 124 N. E. (2d) 91 (1955), noted in 43 111. B. J. 738.
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First District, in an unsatisfactory opinion which ignored all of
the normal concepts of corporate management, held that the
contract was valid and took precedence over the by-laws.
Another case worthy of mention is People ex rel. J. H. Ander-
son Monument Co. v. Rosehill Cemetery Co." Plaintiff therein
brought a quo warranto proceeding charging the corporation with
unlawfully selling monuments and cemetery markers. Such activ-
ity was held to be ultra vires for the reason that no such express
power was given and the implied powers of quasi-public corpora-
tions are to be strictly construed.
The Illinois Securities Act 9 has, in the case of Hammer v.
Sanders-Fye Drilling Co.,1" received further judicial interpreta-
tion during the past year. This case involved a contract to share
the drilling cost of an oil well and providing for the assignment
of a working interest in the event such exploration was successful.
It was there held that such a contract was not a security for
purposes of the act since that portion of the contract pertaining
to drilling costs is not a sale at all, and the transfer of a working
interest is an assignment of oil in place, and therefore an interest
in real estate.
Legislation during the past year produced only relatively
minor changes in the field of corporation law. It is, however,
worth noting that a new and comprehensive act has been passed
for the incorporation and regulation of Savings and Loan Asso-
ciations.1 Also new is an act permitting the organization of
corporations for the purpose of guaranteeing or insuring mem-
bers of credit unions against loss.2 A new act relating to bank
8 3 Ill. (2d) 592, 122 N. E. (2d) 283 (1954). Klingbiel, J. filed a dissenting opin-
ion based on the question of corporate power. Hershey, J. filed a dissenting opinion
based on the issue of the propriety of the remedy in which Fulton, J. concurred.
For a discussion of the latter question, see Section III, Civil Practice and Procedure,
note 60, first series. The case has been noted in 33 CHIoAGO-KENT LAw RVIEW 186.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121Y2 , § 97 et seq.
106 Il. App. (2d) 346, 127 N. E. (2d) 492 (1955).
11 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 565; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 701 et seq.
12 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 1110; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 503al
et seq.
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holding companies' 3 and an amendment 14 to Section 5(g) of the
Business Corporation Act limit the power of corporations to hold
and vote stocks in Illinois banking corporations, though such
restriction does not apply to stocks held at the effective date of
these acts. And lastly, in pursuance of what is rapidly becoming
a tradition, the legislature again saw fit to revise the so-called
"blue sky laws"' 5 by a comprehensive amendment16 thereto.
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Only two cases appear to have had any impact on the subject
field during the past year. The first, that of Wallace v. Malooly,"
7
involved a Massachusetts or business trust, and the plaintiff
therein, a certificate holder, had unsuccessfully demanded access
to a list of other certificate holders for the purpose of persuading
them to vote against a plan proposed by the trust managers. The
Supreme Court, apparently faced with this precise question for
the first time, held that a certificate holder in a business trust did
have such a right so long as it was sought to be exercised for a
proper purpose, and that the plaintiff's purpose was proper. This
result appears to be consistent with other cases 8 holding that a
certificate holder in a business trust has a right to inspect the
books of account.
In the case of Schnackenberg v. Towle, 9 a joint adventure
between two attorneys, operative at a time when one of them
was a judge of the circuit court, was held to violate public policy.
The agreement provided that, in return for a share of the attor-
ney's fees, the judge should assume responsibility for the conduct
of certain litigation, though it should be handled by, and in the
13 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 600; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 16Y2, § 64 et seq.
14 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 601; Ili. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.5(g).
15 The latest complete edition is the Illinois Securities Act of 1953, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 1211/2, § 137.1 et seq.
16 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 180; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 12112, § 137.2
et seq.
174 Ill. (2d) 86, 122 N. E. (2d) 275 (1954).
18 See, for example, Wylie v. Bushnell, 277 Il. 484, 115 N. E. 618 (1917).
194 II. (2d) 561, 123 N. E. (2d) 817 (1955). A petition for certiorari was denied:
349 U. S. 939, 75 S. Ct. 785, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 651 (1955).
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name of, the other. The Supreme Court, in overruling the deci-
sion of the Appellate Court for the First District," took the
position that a circuit judge, during his tenure of office, is not
permitted to practice law and, accordingly, held the agreement
unenforcible.
The 1955 session of the General Assembly effected some con-
structive changes in the procedural rules relating to partnerships.
It is now permissible to sue a partnership in its firm name21 and
service of process may be obtained by leaving a copy thereof
with any partner or agent of the partnership, or by publication
as in the case of individuals.22 A companion act provides that a
judgment rendered against a partnership in its firm name shall
support execution only against partnership property and become
a lien only upon real property held in the firm name. Resort
to these provisions is principally a matter of convenience, since
the individual liability of partners is not barred by a judgment
thereunder until satisfaction is had. 4 With respect to that indi-
vidual liability, it is pertinent to note that partners may now be
sued separately and an unsatisfied judgment against one does not
bar an action against the remainder.25 In such suits, service may
be obtained as in the case of individuals, and also by leaving a
copy of the summons with any other partner and mailing a copy
thereof to the partner sued.2 6
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
Age-old problems involving the extent of the agent's author-
ity are constantly recurring, albeit in a novel form, and the present
year is no exception. In Slape v. Fortner, 2 an agent was author-
ized under a written agreement to contract for the drilling of
20 351 Ii. App. 497, 115 N. E. (2d) 813 (1953).
21 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 439; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 27.1(1).
22 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 439; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 13.4(1).
23 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 449; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § la.
24 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 439; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 27.1(2).
25 Laws 1955, p. H-, . B. No. 439; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 27.
26 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 439; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 13.4(2).
273 Ill. App. (2d) 339, 122 N. E. (2d) 57 (1954), noted in 43 Ill. B. J. 378.
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an oil well, though the price to be paid therefor was left blank.
The agent, without awaiting the insertion of the amount, went
to a well driller, displayed his written authority, and contracted
with him for the drilling of the well. The blank space in the
agreement was never completed, thus dispelling any notions of
ratification. A judgment of the trial court, adverse to the well
driller, was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Fourth Dis-
trict on the ground that when the agent showed the incomplete
written authority to the well driller, he was thereby charged with
notice that the agent's authority was limited. Hence, the princi-
pal could not be bound beyond the limits of the agent's actual
authority.
It is a well established principle in brokerage cases that a
real estate broker who was employed by an owner for the purpose
of finding a buyer for the owner's land, must prove, in order to
become entitled to the commission, that the prospective purchaser
was ready, willing and able to buy the property at the established
terms. In the case of Epstein v. Howard,8 it was held that the
concept, "financial ability," required a showing that the pur-
chaser had sufficient funds on hand or under his control to meet
the owner's terms. Where, however, the owner approves of the
buyer named by the broker, or sells the land to such buyer, it
is conclusively presumed that the particular buyer was acceptable
to the owner as a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy, thus
relieving the broker from said burden of proof as was held in
Greenwald v. Marcus.29 Therein, it was also determined that the
owner is entitled to an opportunity to investigate the buyer's
ability to live up to the designated terms, unless such opportunity
was waived. In the latter instance, he will not be allowed to
object to the buyer's financial ability, even though the negotiations
may never be consummated.
285 Ill. App. (2d) 553, 126 N. E. (2d) 162 (1955).
293 IlM. App. (2d) 495, 123 N. E. (2d) 139 (1954).
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The attorney-client relationship involves a special type of
agency with special and peculiar incidents and features. 0 Yet,
this does not mean that it does not partake of some of the basic
principles and concepts evolved by the law of agency. An apt
illustration is the case of Petrando v. Barry," where it was
pointed out that an attorney was not liable to a printer for the
cost of printing the briefs and abstract which the attorney had
ordered in a case involving his client. The court thought that an
attorney, who is authorized to appeal a case, has implied authority
to order the printing of briefs and thereby bind his client for the
printing costs. The fact that the briefs and abstract showed the
name of the client for whom the attorney had acted was held to
be sufficient notice to the printer that the attorney was acting
in a representative capacity.
An interesting case involving the master-servant relationship
arose in Nordland v. Poor Sisters of St. Francis Seraph of Per-
petual Devotion.2  A hospital intern, while engaged in assisting
surgeons in an operation conducted in the operating room of the
hospital, was injured by the explosion of the anesthetic machine.
The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of his suit for the reason that the intern was
an employee of the hospital and, as such, could recover only
workmen's compensation for the injuries received. As an intern,
the plaintiff was not an independent contractor since his work
and duties were regulated by the hospital, which not only took
care of his maintenance, but also retained the right to discharge
him. Nor could he be considered a "loaned employee" for the
time during which the operation took place. Although the intern
had to follow the surgeon's directions during the operation, the
hospital had undertaken to supply surgeons operating in the
hospital with the assistance of interns, and when an intern was
so engaged, he was fulfilling the hospital's duty.
30 See, for example, this Section, note 19, and Section III, Civil Practice and
Procedure, note 45, second series.
314 Ill. App. (2d) 319, 124 N. E. (2d) 85 (1955).
324 Ill. App. (2d) 48, 123 N. E. (2d) 121 (1955).
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LABOR LAW
There has recently been an upsurge of cases in various juris-
dictions in which individual employees, whose rights had been
disregarded by their employer and collective bargaining repre-
sentative alike, attempted to enforce those rights in court. Most
of these attempts were unsuccessful, due primarily to the narrow
and legalistic approach which the courts took in these situations,
an approach which failed to take into consideration the realities
of modern industrial life. Of such a nature is the case of Anson
v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 33 in which a group of employees asserted
that their rights, established in a proper collective bargaining
agreement, had been violated by their employer. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint in the lower court. The plaintiffs, who had grounded
their action on the collective bargaining agreement, should have
clearly and unequivocally alleged that they had exhausted all the
remedies provided by the agreement itself, such as grievance
procedure, before they ought to be entitled to appeal to the courts
for relief. Moreover, the court opined, if at the conclusion of
negotiations between employer and union in a grievance proceed-
ing, the employer had acted wrongfully, he may be charged with
the commission of an unfair labor practice over which the National
Labor Relations Board exercises exclusive jurisdiction. What
unfair labor practice the employer would or could commit in such
an event is not stated by the court and can hardly be visualized,
not even by a person endowed with an uncommon degree of
imagination.
In another case, that of United Protective Workers v. Ford
Motor Company,3 4 an employee was more successful in safeguard-
ing his rights under a collective bargaining agreement. The em-
ployee had contended that he was discharged in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement governing his working conditions.
The court awarded him damages and emphasized that where the
33 222 F. (2d) 100 (1955).
34 223 F. (2d) 49 (1955). For a discussion of the question of damages, see Sec-
tion III, Civil Practice and Procedure, note 67, second series.
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employer had made it clear that he would not change his position,
the employee need not first exhaust his remedies under the con-
tract before seeking relief in the courts.
Two other cases appear to be worthy of brief mention. The
case of Retail Druggists' Association v. Local 676-D, A. F. of L.35
should serve as a reminder to the bar that even peaceful picketing
may be unlawful where it is carried on in the prosecution of an
unlawful purpose. Although discussed elsewhere, 6 it should be
noted herein that that portion of the Industrial Home Work Act
which prohibits the processing of metal springs by home workers 7
was, in the case of Figura v. CumminsP3 held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court.
With respect to legislation, it is appropriate to note a change,
bulwarked by appropriate penalties, requiring that corporations
pay their employees at least semi-monthly, and that such wage
payments be made not later than thirteen days after the end of
the pay period.3 1 Other legislation 0 amended the Wage Assign-
ment Act 4' so as to render it inapplicable to transactions under




Problems raised by the decision in Grasse v. Dealer's Trans-
port Co.45 still continue to occupy the courts. Therein, the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional the first paragraph of former
Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 46 which limited
353 Ill. App. (2d) 325, 122 N. E. (2d) 66 (1954).
36 See Section VII, Public Law, note 26.
37 1Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 252(G).
384 Ill. (2d) 44, 122 N. E. (2d) 162 (1954).
39 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 736; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §§ 36, 37.
40 Laws 1955, p. H-, . B. No. 586; Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 39.9.
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 39.1 et seq.
42 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 74, § 19 et seq. See, in particular, ibid., § 35.
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 496.1 et seq.
44 48 Stat. 1216; 12 U. S. C. A. § 1751 et seq.
45412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
375.
46 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b).
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an employee injured by a third party tort-feasor, operating under
the Act,47 to a recovery of compensation from his employer. In
Geneva Construction Company v. Martin Transfer & Storage
Company,48 the Supreme Court concluded that a non-negligent
employer, who had paid workmen's compensation to an employee
injured by a third party tort-feasor, could recover the amount
of such compensation from the tort-feasor under common law
principles of subrogation in the absence of any express statutory
provision to that effect. It should be noted that the plaintiff-
employer had filed its complaint prior to the 1953 amendments
of the Workmen's Compensation Act which provided a mode of
statutory subrogation for such employers.
49
Repercussions of the Grasse case were likewise involved in
Govedarica v. Yellow Cab Company.50 An injured employee, who
was subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, commenced a common law action against the third party
tort-feasor after the two-year statute of limitations had run. Yet,
he alleged that he was nevertheless entitled to maintain the suit,
since Section 25 of the Act provided that if any of its provisions
should be declared invalid, the period between the injury and
such declaration shall not be counted as a part of the period of
limitations for the commencement of an action relating to such
injury." Based upon that provision, the employee reasoned that
the statute of limitations was tolled until the Grasse case was
decided. The court disagreed with that contention and stated
simply and categorically, without giving any reasons, that the
above statutory provision pertained only to actions which arose
out of some of the provisions of the Act, but did not have any
effect on common law actions.
Although not technically within the survey period, it may be
appropriate to note that, in the cases of Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
47 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.
48 4 Il. (2d) 273, 122 N. E. (2d) 540 (1964). For other aspects of the case, see
Section III, Civil Practice and Procedure, note 71, first series.
49 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b).
50216 F. (2d) 499 (1954).
51 Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.25.
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Industrial Commission52 and Laclede Steel Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission," the Supreme Court has clarified the application of the
Workmen's Compensation Act54 to heart cases. In both instances,
the employee involved had a weakened heart and while perform-
ing his regular, though strenuous, job duties, he suffered a heart
attack and collapsed. The employer argued that such a heart
attack suffered by the employee in performing his normal duties
could not be classified as an accidental injury arising out of the
employment, and that such classification should be reserved to
those cases where the heart attack was caused by either a tearing
of the blood vessels or heart tissue, or by some unusual strain
not normally attendant to the job duties. The Supreme Court
rejected these contentions and declined to make arbitrary refine-
ments between various types of heart diseases. It declared that
if death or disability was caused or precipitated by "the unfore-
seen and unpremeditated giving away of a part of the employee's
body ' 55 while performing his work, the resulting death or dis-
ability was compensable and it did not make any difference
whether the employee would not have suffered the heart attack
had he been in normal health, since the Act was not limited to
healthy employees only.
The last session of the General Assembly produced a number
of minor changes in both the Workmen's Compensation Act 56 and
the Occupational Diseases Act,57 as well as increasing the amount
of compensation awardable under each. Without going into a
complete analysis of the changes so made, it might be worth brief
mention that, in cases where death has resulted from compensable
injury, the minimum award shall hereafter be $6,000 and the maxi-
mum award is restricted to $9,250. This is the equivalent of a
general increase of $1,250 over prior levels.
52 6 111. (2d) 278, 128 N. B. (2d) 714 (1955).
536 111. (2d) 296, 128N. E. (2d) 718 (1955).
54 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.
55 6 Ill. (2d) 278 at 294, 128 N. E. (2d) 714 at 717.
56 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 859; I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.




Outstanding among the cases establishing or clarifying gen-
eral principles of contract law is the holding of the Illinois
Supreme Court in the case of Schnackenberg v. Towle.1 The plain-
tiff there, a circuit judge, sued in equity for an accounting to
recover a portion of a legal fee paid to an attorney with whom
the judge, while holding office, had labored jointly in the interest
of the client pursuant to an agreement to divide the fee and share
responsibility for the handling of the client's claims. The Appel-
late Court had permitted a recovery on the contract but the
Supreme Court reversed, following a careful review of comparable
cases 2 and legislative action which had stemmed therefrom, when
it came to the conclusion that the plaintiff should have no help
from the courts as the contract was one against public policy.
Opposition to the contract was said to lie in the fact that it would
be inclined to bring the administration of justice into suspicion
and disrepute. The holding, without doubt, broadens the base for
holding similar contracts to be unenforcible.
The effect to be given to lack of mutuality of obligation was
brought sharply to attention by the holding in the case of Paid
v.R osen,' a case which again discloses the need for legislation
to effectuate the "firm" offer or at least for the exercise of
extreme care when drafting an agreement under which one of
the two bargaining parties has the option of not performing his
promise. In that case, the defendant promised to sell his business
to the plaintiff at an agreed price, contingent on the buyer's
ability to secure a lease on the business building. The buyer did
not bind himself to try to secure the lease although it would be
implied that he should honestly try to do so. The buyer evidenced
14 Ill. (2d) 561, 123 N. E. (2d) 817 (1955). noted in 43 Ill. B. J. 735, reversing
351 Il. App. 497, 115 N. E. (2d) 813 (1953). Certiorari has been denied: 349 U. S.
939, 75 S. Ct. 785, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 651 (1955).
2 To the extent that the views expressed therein were in conflict with the current
holding, the court overruled the cases of Town of Bruce v. Dickey. 116 Ill. 527,
6 N. E. 435 (1886), and O'Hare v. Chicago, Madison & Northern R. R. Co., 139 Ill.
151, 28 N. E. 923 (1891).
33 Il1. App. (2d) 423, 122 N. E. (2d) 603 (1954), noted in 1955 Il. L. Forum 149.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1954-1955
a willingness to perform but the seller refused to abide by bar-
gain and, when sued, successfully pleaded the lack of mutuality
in the arrangement.
Notice might well be taken here of the case of Cwik v. Condre
4
for the Appellate Court there held that the recently enacted
statute abolishing the effect of a seal5 had no bearing on contracts
made prior to its enactment, for which reason a sealed release,
in keeping with common law principles, 6 was not subject to attack
on the ground of lack of consideration absent any claim of fraud
in its procurement. Mention might also be made at this point of
the Supreme Court holding in the case of In re Schneider's
Estate,7 a case discussed more fully hereafter, 8 in which the court
accepted oral evidence to modify a written agreement creating a
joint tenancy in a bank deposit because the evidence tended to
show a lack of donative intention. One cannot be certain, here-
after, that every written contract will be able to withstand attack
from an assault by parole evidence.
Doctrines having bearing on the law relating to specialized
types of contracts,9 or quasi-contractual obligations, are discussed
separately hereafter under appropriate classifications.
BILLS AND NOTES
Although this area of the law is usually most noteworthy for
its inactivity, factual situations will occasionally arise which
necessarily produce some addition or change in legal concepts. An
example of this is to be found in the case of Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation v. Wainer' wherein a bank, insured by the
plaintiff, had advanced money to the defendant and had taken
4 4 111. App. (2d) 380, 124 N. E. (2d) 612 (1955).
5 I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 153b.
6 Woodbury v. U. S. Casualty Co., 284 Ill. 227, 120 N. E. 8 (1918).
76 111. (2d) 180, 127 N. E. (2d) 445 (1955), noted in 44 Ill. B. J. 54, affirming 2
Ill. App. (2d) 560, 120 N. E. (2d) 353 (1954), noted in 33 CMCAGO-KENT LAW
RSVEw 189. Hershey, J., wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Klingbiel. J.
8 See Division VI, Property, note 21.
9 No cases of consequence relating to contracts for the sale of personal property
were determined during the survey period.
104 Ill. App. (2d) 233, 124 N. E. (2d) 29 (1955).
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his note in return, although it appeared that the true agreement
was that the note should not be enforced against the defendant
and that the payee bank would look to a second bank, in which
the defendant had a deposit, for payment. The payee bank was
closed by the State Auditor and, pursuant to its statutory duty,1
the plaintiff paid off the deposits and purchased certain of the
assets including the note in question, said note then being overdue.
The Appellate Court held that this note could be enforced against
the maker by FDIC although the rationale on which the decision
rests is obscure. Inasmuch as the note was taken by plaintiff
when past due, it would appear that there could be no recovery
under ordinary principles of negotiable instrument or simple con-
tract law. The decision would, therefore, seem to rest on some
form of estoppel and this supposition is strengthened by the stress
the court put on the fact that there was a secret agreement in-
tended to deceive creditors and public authority. The estoppel
theory is weakened by the fact the note was past due, hence a
purchaser after maturity should not be entitled to rely thereon.
But this deficiency might appear to have been remedied by the
fact that the FDIC was under an obligation to purchase the
subject note as hereinabove mentioned. It would seem that at
least a conditional obligation, made absolute by subsequent events,
arose at the time the note was issued by the maker. In that event,
the operative facts of estoppel would be created prior to the time
the note, and the promise contained therein, became stale. If this
hypothesis be true, then a vital distinction has been created
between voluntary purchasers and those under an obligation to
purchase.
Another case made worthy of note by its particular facts is
that of Crawford Door Sales Company v. Kowalik. 2 Therein, the
plaintiff brought suit against the treasurer of a corporation on
certain notes given to secure an extension of the time of payment
on the corporation's indebtedness. Between the time the indebted-
ness had been incurred and the time the notes were issued, the
1164 Stat. 873; 12 U. S. C. A. § 1811 et seq.
124 I1. App. (2d) 32, 123 N. E. (2d) 111 (1954).
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corporation had changed its name. Nevertheless, the notes were
executed by the defendant in the old name, under express author-
ity and direction of the board of directors. It was there held that
the defendant was not personally liable, despite Section 20 of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,l" one which provides that
a person signing in a representative capacity is not absolved from
liability if he does not indicate his principal. This result was
reached on the ground that the intention of the parties was con-
trolling, both the plaintiff and the corporation intending the notes
to apply to the indebtedness running between them. Thus it would
seem that the statutory section in question has been expanded to
absolve a person signing in a representative capacity from liabil-
ity to the payee even though he does not properly disclose his
principal provided the payee knows the identity of the principal
and intends to accept the latter's obligation.
INSURANCE
Under a decision which was novel in Illinois, the Supreme
Court, in Simnon v. Iowa Mutual Casualty Conpany,14 held that
timely notice of an accident covered by an automobile liability
policy issued by the defendant could be given by the injured
plaintiff's attorney so as to prevent rise of the defense of non-
compliance with the terms of the policy. After the accident, the
plaintiff's attorney there concerned wrote to the insurer request-
ing a settlement, and this was the insurer's first notice. Subse-
quently, a summons served upon the insured was forwarded to
the insurer who refused to defend the suit for the reason that
the insured had not given notice and a default judgment was
pronounced against the insured. The company, in the meantime,
had inadvertently accepted two premium payments on the policy.
In a direct action against the insurer, the crucial issue was one
as to whether or not notice by the attorney for the claimant was
sufficient. The trial court held it was; the Appellate Court re-
13 11. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 40.
143 I1. (2d) 313, 121 N. E. (2d) 509 (1954), noted in 4 DePaul L. Rev. 331,
reversing 350 Il. App. 1, 111 N. E. (2d) 374 (1953). Hershey, J., dissented, stating
that the opinion of the Appellate Court correctly applied the law.
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versed; but the Supreme Court sustained the trial court, saying
that notice "by or on behalf of the insured" could reasonably be
interpreted to include notice at the hand of the injured plaintiff
or his attorney.
In the only other case of consequence, that of Leonard v.
Independence Life & Accident Company, 15 a beneficiary named in
a comprehensive personal accident insurance policy brought suit
to recover benefits allegedly due because of the death of the in-
sured, he having been intentionally stabbed by a rival. Among
other exclusions contained in the policy was one to the effect that
the insurance did not cover injury, fatal or non-fatal, resulting
from "the intentional acts of the insured or of any other person
except assaults by burglars or robbers." The beneficiary relied
on an earlier case involving comparable facts but based on a
policy with a narrower exclusionary provision." Recovery was
denied, however, when the court found the provision in question
to be clear and unambiguous and broad enough to prevent liability
of the type asserted.
While on the subject of insurance, mention might here be
made of the fact that the statute relating to evidence of financial
responsibility in motor vehicle cases, if provided in the form of
a liability insurance policy, has been revised so as to require
coverage in the $10,000/$20,000 class rather than at the lower
limits heretofore prevailing.' 7 Further revision has occurred with
respect to authorized investments for domestic insurance com-
panies, 8 and the size of the group, for purpose of group life
insurance, has been reduced from twenty-five to ten employees. 19
Smaller enterprises will now be able to secure employee coverage
which heretofore had been limited to larger organizations.
154 Ill. App. (2d) 244, 124 N. E. (2d) 10 (1955).
16 Ziolkowsky v. Continental Casualty Co., 365 Ill. 594, 7 N. E. (2d) 451 (1937).
17 Laws 1955, p.-, S. B. No. 168; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95Y2, § 58e.
18 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 288; IMi. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 737
19 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 905, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 842.
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QUASI-CONTRACTS
There is little opportunity in law for one who has been a
party to an express contract to substitute, as basis for recovery,
any promise implied in law arising from the benefits which he
may have conferred. What little opportunity that does exist in
this direction is very properly denied to one who could be said
to be in pari delicto under some form of illegal arrangement.
20
It should, therefore, prove to be no surprise to note that, in
Kilian v. Frazier,21 a plaintiff who had been duped into paying
money to another to be used to influence public officials in con-
nection with the granting of contracts concerning supplies to
public institutions22 was denied any right to recover the money
so paid, and this whether his complaint proceeded in quasi-con-
tract or in tort for fraud and deceit.
In the only other case of consequence dealing with quasi-
contractual concepts, that of Hammer v. Sanders, 23 the attempt
of several persons to recover money paid for securities allegedly
issued in violation of the Illinois Securities Act 24 fell afoul of
another firm concept, to-wit: one who wishes to repudiate an
express agreement and substitute a promise implied in law in
place thereof must restore, or at least tender a return of, the
benefits he has received.25 The case also serves as an illustration
for the fact that a pleading allegation to the effect that tender has
been made would be meaningless if, actually, no tender had been
made, thereby leaving the express contract still in existence.
20 Mention has previously been made in this section of the case of Schnackenberg
v. Towle, 4 Ill. (2d) 561, 123 N. E. (2d) 817 (1955), which affords sidelights on this
point.
214 Ill. App. (2d) 108, 123 N. E. (2d) 592 (1954).
22 It is criminal, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 139, to conspire to
interfere with competition in bidding or to "chill" the bids on public contracts.
236 111. App. (2d) 346, 127 N. E. (2d) 492 (1955).
24 The action was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 121/2, § 97 et seq. This
statute was repealed and replaced with another in 1953, but civil rights under the
former statute were preserved: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 137.16.
25 The case indicates that a formal disclaimer of interest may be required in the
event the thing transferred later turns out to be worthless.
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SURETYSHIP
Those cases during the year which dealt with novel points
in the law of suretyship grew out of public bonds or recognizances
rather than private contracts. The nature of the obligation under-
taken was the principal matter of concern in the case of People
ex rel. Schull v. Massachiusetts Bonding & Insurance Company. 6
The compensated surety had there signed a permit bond on an
application to drill an oil well 7 and suit was predicated on this
bond because of the failure on the part of the principal to cause
the surface of the land to be restored, as near as possible, to its
former condition. After suit had been commenced, the surety,
at its own expense, caused the well site to be restored to the
satisfaction of the Department of Mines and Minerals and then
relied on this fact in support of the defense that, as no damage
had been suffered by the breach, the surety should be absolved of
liability. It was held, however, that the statutorily required in-
strument was in the nature of a penalty bond and not merely
some form of indemnity agreement, hence a judgment for the
penal sum was affirmed. In the case of Board of Education v.
Swam, s by contrast, the compensated corporate surety on a
performance and payment bond on a public job2" was held to
have subjected itself to a liability greater than that required by
law because it had undertaken to "promptly make payment" to
those who supplied labor or materials, hence be~ame subject to
suit on the bond as soon as the principal made default.
While enforcement of most bonds may be had either by suit
in debt or by scire facias proceedings, the case of People v.
Rocco ° demonstrates that, as to bail bonds given in connection
with criminal proceedings, the remedy by scire facias described
264 Iii. (2d) 23, 122 N. E. (2d) 185 (1954).
27 Bond for this purpose is required by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 104, § 67.
285 Ill. App. (2d) 124, 124 N. E. (2d) 554 (1955).
29 Bonds of this character are required by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 29, § 15.
A suit on the bond by a materialman or other beneficiary would ordinarily be
delayed until after final settlement on the prime contract: Ibid., § 16.
304 Ill. App. (2d) 238, 124 N. E. (2d) 25 (1955). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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in the Criminal Code"' is now the sole and exclusive remedy.
Some earlier decisions to the contrary,2 achieved prior to the
adoption of the statute in question, were there said to be in-
applicable because the more recent legislative expression on the
point, from the very fact of its completeness on the subject, was
held to be controlling. When scire facias proceedings are used,
as in the case of People v. Young," it will apparently do the
compensated corporate surety no good to urge that its liability
has been discharged because continuances have been granted to
the accused person without the consent of the surety. The rule
that modification of the prime contract without the surety's con-
sent operates as a discharge would appear to be one to be confined
in its operation to private contracts and be inapplicable to bail
bonds.
3 4
In the event the bond, or the statute on which the bond is
based, requires the giving of notice or the performance of con-
ditions precedent to liability, it would be expected that the surety
would be entitled to rely on a non-performance of such require-
ments as a defense. It became a close question, therefore, in the
case of MeWane Cast Iron Pipe Company v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Company,35 to determine whether the particular public
contract bond, which was silent on the point, had been issued
pursuant to, and incorporated by implication, the terms of the
pertinent statute or formed an unqualified common law obligation
on the part of the surety. On finding that the bond had been given
in conformity with statutory mandate,"0 hence could be said to
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 625 et seq.
32 People v. Witt, 19 Ill. 169 (1867) ; People v. Pate, 15 I1. 221 (1853).
33 6 I1. App. (2d) 123, 126 N. E. (2d) 746 (1955).
34 The holding In Ogden v. People, 62 II1. 63 (1871), may be explained on the
ground that, in the event the prosecution seeks a continuance, a new recognizance
should be taken for the surety has fully discharged his obligation by seeing to it
that the principal appeared on the date originally fixed.
35 3 111. App. (2d) 399, 122 N. E. (2d) 435 (1954).
36 The bond in suit, like the one involved in the case of Board of Education v.
Swam, 5 Ill. App. (2d) 124, 124 N. E. (2d) 554 (1955), mentioned above at note 28,
was not drafted In statutory terms but contained an undertaking, not required by
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 29, § 15, that the principal should "promptly make
payment" to suppliers of labor or materials.
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include the statutory condition for notice,7 the court achieved the
result that the surety possessed an absolute defense since the
claimant had failed to charge that statutory notice had been
given.3
8
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Without question, the one outstanding achievement in the past
year has been the culmination of approximately five years of effort
on the part of the Joint Committee on Illinois Civil Procedure' in
the form of the passage, by the legislature, of the Revised Civil
Practice Act,2 effective January 1, 1956, together with the adoption,
by the Supreme Court, of a revised system of court rules.' Any
attempt to provide a complete commentary on these changes would
cause this survey to reach to an inordinate length. The principal
changes or developments made thereby are, however, noted in this
section at appropriate points and minor changes in verbiage have
been left to the considered attention of the bar.4
87 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. I, Ch. 29, § 16, directs that no supplier shall have a
right of action "unless he shall have filed a verified notice . . . within 180 days
after the date of the last item of work or the furnishing of the last item of mate-
rials." The court likened this notice to the one required by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-11, to support a civil action against a municipality.
38 The case of Laclede Steel Co. v. Hecker-Moon Co., 279 Ill. App. 295 (1935), was
distinguished on the basis the bond there concerned was of the common-law variety.
1 The Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association, at the sug-
gestion of the Supreme Court, organized this committee and charged it with re-
sponsibility to examine into matters of procedural reform achieved elsewhere since
the adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1938 and to recommend changes
therein. The committee recommendations, with supporting explanations and sug-
gested revisions were placed in print and made available to the bar about a year
ago. See Tentative Final Draft of Proposed Amendments to Illinois Civil Practice
Act (Burdette Smith Co., Chicago, 1954).
2 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 439; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 1 et seq.
The publishers of the bound volumes of the Illinois statutes, to avoid a degree of
confusion which heretofore existed in the numbering system because of the one-
time existence of earlier practice acts, have utilized the same section numbering as
that found In the legislative bill.
3 These rules, also effective on January 1, 1956, may be found in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, beginning at Section 101.1. The number following the decimal
point is the same as that adopted by the court in its numbering of the new rules.
4 In addiion to the pamphlet supplement to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955 published by
Burdette Smith Co., Chicago, 1955, which contains the comments of the Joint Com-
mittee, see also Tone, "The New Amendments to the Civil Practice Act," 43 Ill. B. J.
900-5.
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AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES
The structure of the judicial department of the state, in gen-
eral, remains the same as heretofore 5 but emphasis has been
added, by the holding in Starck v. Chicago & North Western Rail-
way Company,6 to the irrational results which can follow from
ill-considered legislative tinkering, under the power given to
create courts,7 with the shape of the judicial department. By
virtue of the holding therein, it is now possible for courts organ-
ized under the general Municipal Court Act' to entertain jurisdic-
tion over transitory tort causes of action without limit, no matter
where the events occurred, provided it is possible for these courts
to gain jurisdiction over the parties to the suit. The state is now
presented with the ridiculous spectacle of having still another set
of tribunals, originally intended to exercise restricted jurisdic-
tion, working in competition with the major courts of the state.
Circuit courts, on the other hand, have been denied the right to
consider election contests growing out of the organization of
mosquito abatement districts9 by reason of the holding in the case
of Bell v. South Cook County Mosquito Abatement District,0 a
case which affirms the view that matters of this nature, despite a
provision in the Election Code tending to indicate otherwise,11
belong within the exclusive jurisdiction of the county courts.' 2
5 A proposed amendment to the judicial article of the state constitution which
would have produced a drastic but entirely desirable revision both in the court
structure and the method of operation of the judicial department met with rough
treatment at the hands of the Executive Committee of the House in the 69th General
Assembly and failed in passage. See 36 Chicago Bar Record 475 (1955), at p. 476.
64 Ill. (2d) 616, 123 N. E. (2d) 826 (1955), noted In 33 CincAGO-KENT LAW
RVmIw 263.
7 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 442 et seq.
9 Such districts may be formed in the manner directed by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 74 et seq.
103 Ill. (2d) 353, 121 N. E. (2d) 473 (1954).
11 11. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 23-24.
12 See Heaney v. Northeast Park District, 360 Ill. 254, 195 N. E. 649 (1935). Views
expressed therein were .followed on the ground the statute there construed had
been afterwards re-enacted Into the present Election Code without change, a fact
which was said to evidence legislative concurrence with the court's exposition of
the legislative intent.
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While treating with courts, it might be considered appropriate
to discuss the conduct of judges serving in the courts.13 Accord-
ing to the facts in the case of Smallwood v. Soutter,4 the trial
judge there concerned, faced with a question as to the right of an
attorney to represent one of the litigants, apparently appointed
another attorney to inquire into the situation and, on the latter's
report with recommendations, proceeded to enter an order from
which an appeal was taken. Pointing out that the lawyer who
had acted as judge-designate was neither a master in chancery 15
nor a special commissioner, 6 and finding a total absence of au-
thority for the appointment of any other person to serve as
assistant to the judge, the reviewing tribunal reversed the order
on the ground the judge had no power to delegate any of his
functions to an appointee and, when he had attempted to do so,
had deprived the litigant of the right to a full and complete
hearing before the court.
Venue requirements, as well as jurisdictional limitations,
should be observed if a given court is to have authority to proceed
with the case so it should furnish no surprise to note that, in Green
v. Walsh,7 a judgment taken by confession was ordered set aside
as wholly void when it was made to appear that the note in suit
had been executed out of the state, the defendants were non-resi-
dents, and had no property in the county in which the proceed.
ing had been instituted,' inasmuch as at least one of these ele-
ments would have been needed to establish venue and to support
13 See ante. Division II, Contracts. note 1, for discussion of the case of Schnacken-
berg v.,Towle, 4 Ill. (2d) 561, 123 N. E. (2d) 817 (1955).
145 Ill. App. (2d) 303, 125 N. E. (2d) 679 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
15 Appointment of masters in chancery is regulated by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2,
Ch. 90. § 1. By two additions to that statute, provision has now been made for the
completion of proceedings before masters whose terms of office have expired or who
cease to act for any reason: Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 450; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 2, Ch. 90, §§ 5a-Sb.
16 Authority for the appointment of this official is conferred by ibid., § 5. See also
Simpson v. Harrison, 328 Ill. App. 425, 66 N. E. (2d) 494 (1946).
17 5 II. App. (2d) 535, 126 N. E. (2d) 398 (1955).
18 The jurisdictional requirements of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 50(5),
relating to judgments by confession, have been reiterated in Section 50(4) of the
Revised Civil Practice Act.
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the judgment.19 Errors in venue may, however, be waived if not
promptly asserted20 so the defendant in O'Laughlin v. O'Laugh-
lin,21 who had joined issue and had litigated the case before rais-
ing any question as to the accuracy of venue allegations, was
held to be in no position to complain even if an error in venue
had occurred. While there has been some reshuffling of the
statutory provisions as to venue, the controlling principles are
generally the same except that a new section relates to suits
against partnerships, 22 machinery has been provided for the hear-
ing and disposition of motions for transfer to a proper venue
23
and, in cases where defendants reside in different counties, a de-
fendant who has once raised the point of an erroneous joinder to
support a claim of wrong venue and who has lost thereon must
renew his motion at the close of the evidence if he desires to
rely on the ruling as ground for reversal on appeal.24
Jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the parties is also
a matter of vital concern to the successful prosecution of a suit.
Although no change has occurred with respect to jurisdiction over
the plaintiff, who submits himself to the control of the court by
the mere act of filing suit, and very little has been done to change
the statute law concerning the summons or service thereof,25 new
methods for service on private corporations 6 and on partners
19 Mention might be made of the fact that the defendants were careful to use a
special and limited appearance to prevent the court from obtaining jurisdiction
over them. By contrast, see the effect to be given to a failure to preserve the
jurisdictional question in the holding in Liberty National Bank of Chicago v. Vance,
3 Ill. App. (2d) 1, 120 N. E. (2d) 349 (1954).
20 A degree of vagueness on the point to be found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953. Vol. 1.
Ch. 110, § 135, has been removed by Section 8(2) of the Revised Civil Practice Act
which now expressly declares that all "objections of improper venue are waived"
unless the defendant takes action in the time and manner there specified.
214 Il1. App. (2d) 323, 124 N. E. (2d) 88 (1955).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 6(2).
23 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 6(3), § 10, and § 11.
24 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 9.
25 Rule 5 of the Illinois Supreme Court now states that a copy of the complaint.
to be furnished by the plaintiff, is to be attached to the copy of the summons used
in making service. Failure to furnish a copy of the complaint does not invalidate
service but does subject the offending party to an 9bligation to reimburse for ex-
pense incurred in obtaining a copy.
26 Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 13.3.
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and partnerships 27 have been devised. In suits against non-resi-
dents who have, by reason of the doing of acts specified in Section
17 of the Revised Civil Practice Act,28 become amenable to the
exercise of an in personam jurisdiction to be wielded by the
courts of the state,29 the summons is to be personally served
outside the state before jurisdiction can be said to attach.3 0  The
jurisdiction so acquired is one of limited nature.31
In the realm of case law on this aspect of procedure, the case
of Hale v. Hale,32 points out the obvious proposition that no court
has power to enter an order which could, in any way, bind a per-
son not a party to the proceeding and, that being the case, such
court would be equally without power to punish such person for
contemptuous disregard of such an order.33  By contrast, in
O'Rourke v. O'Rourke,34 reinforcement was given to the proposi-
27 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 13.4.
28 The legislature followed the recommendations of the Joint Committee in speci-
fying that (a) the transaction of any business, (b) the commission of a tortious
act, or (c) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate, within the state,
should be sufficient to make the person concerned amenable to jurisdiction. Sub-
stantial revision was made, however, in the fourth recommendation which said that
the "insuring of any person, property or risk located within the State, whether the
policy is delivered by mail or otherwise," should be sufficient for this purpose. On
that point, see note in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVTEW 148. As revised, the fourth
ground is practically valueless since it is available only if the defendant has been
"contracting to insure" property within the state at the time of contracting. The
door has now been opened for haggling over the question as to the place where the
contract was made, a point usually resolved by reference to language in the insur-
ance contract itself.
29 The basic principle involved is analogous to the one which supports control
over the non-resident motorist who has used the state highways: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95Y2, § 23.
30 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 16(1).
31 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 16(3).
325 Ill. App. (2d) 90, 124 N. E. (2d) 596 (1955).
33 The order in question grew out of a custody fight incident to a divorce proceed-
ing. It purported to command a sister of the defendant, not herself a party to the
suit nor enjoying custody by virtue of any court order, to deliver custody of the
children of the marriage to the plaintiff. The physical presence of the sister in the
courtroom at the time the order was entered was said not to be enough to give the
court authority over her. Compare this holding with the one attained in the case of
Horn v. Horn, 5 Ill. App. (2d) 346, 125 N. E. (2d) 539 (1955), also arising in the
Third District, wherein it was held that a custodian of a child and a stranger to
the suit, acting pursuant to court order temporarily vesting custody in him, was
not an indispensable party to proceedings to modify the custody order as he pos-
sessed neither natural nor property rights in the child.
343 Ill. App. (24d) 464, 122 N. E. (2d) 829 (1954). Following a decree for
divorce in DuPage County under which questions relating to custody of the child
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tion that, once one court has acquired jurisdiction over the par-
ties and the subject matter, no other court of the state should at-
tempt to assert control in the same area for, if this was per-
mitted, orderly procedure would tend to be disrupted. Without
question, as in Lichter v. Scher,"' an in personam default judg-
ment could not be permitted to stand in the face of a showing that
the defendant had never been served with process 3 6 but jurisdic-
tion would exist, in an in rem proceeding, to sequester property
within the state, provided the same can be brought under the
control of the court, even though the defendant be a non-resident,
hence immune from personal service. The explanation for the
seemingly contradictory results attained in the sequestration
cases of Failing v. Failing3V and Ragen v. Ragen s lies in the fact
that, in the first, no effort was made to seize or even to specifically
describe the property over which jurisdiction was sought where-
as, in the latter case, the complaint was full and specific on the
point.3
9
Preliminary to suit, the attorney who has given attention to
the foregoing jurisdictional problems should also, in an appro-
priate case, give thought to the matter of trial by jury since, if
an appropriate demand is not made in timely fashion, the right
to trial by jury may be waived. 40  Nothing has been done in the
course of the year to materially affect the law insofar as it re-
were reserved, one of the litigants instituted proceedings in Cook County to resolve
the custody question. It was held that the court in Cook County lacked jurisdiction
to enter any order on the point.
854 Ill. App. (2d) 37, 123 N. E. (2d) 161 (1954).
36 It appeared there that the sheriff returned service on a corporate defendant in
a dram shop case by delivering process to a bartender employee rather than to an
officer or agent of the corporation. In that respect, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 13.3.
374 Ill. (2d) 11, 122 N. E. (2d) 167 (1954), noted in 43 Ill. B. J. 508.
384 Ill. App. (2d) 445, 124 N. E. (2d) 628 (1954).
39 While prior seizure, as by injunction, writ of sequestration, or attachment
would clearly serve to confer jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, in Failing v. Failing,
4 Ill. (2d) 11, 122 N. E. (2d) 167 (1954), indicated that, in view of its tacit approval
given to the procedure followed in Wilson v. Smart, 324 Ill. 276, 155 N. E. 288
(1927), it would probably hold a complaint describing the property In detail and
indicating that relief was sought against the same to be sufficient to support in rem
jurisdiction, particularly so if the notice by publication to the non-resident defend-
ant also spoke on the point in detail.
40 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 64.
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lates to the plaintiff and the outset of the case41 but the decision in
Schwartz v. Lake View Toot & Manufacturing Company 2 reveals
a situation which could lead to difficulty in the event the defendant,
upon filing a counterclaim, first demands trial by jury and then
later elects to waive such right. It was there held that if the
plaintiff, upon filing a reply to the counterclaim, does not join
in the jury demand he may not later assert the right to trial by
jury upon learning of the defendant's waiver.4  The cautious at-
torney concerned with a civil suit should, therefore, preserve his
client's rights in this respect at every stage of the case.
In much the same way, attention should be given to applicable
statutes of limitation and the effect they may have on the litiga-
tion.44 Brief mention might be made of the fact that, in Orlicki
v. McCarthy,45 the Supreme Court held the recently enacted addi-
tion to the Dram Shop Act, one imposing a time limitation on
suits thereunder,46 was retroactive in its operation, hence could
be utilized to bar a suit on a claim arising prior to the enactment
thereof but on which no action had been instituted until after the
specified period had expired. On the statutory front, new sections
have been added to the Limitations Act to create bars to proceed-
41 Section 64 of the Revised Civil Practice Act, to avoid the possibility of incur-
ring unnecessary expense in the event the case may be dismissed on motion,
permits the defendant to delay jury demand on his part "not later than the filing
of his answer."
424 Ill. App. (2d) 565, 124 N. E. (2d) 570 (1955), noted in 33 CHICACO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 381.
43 The case actually turned on the construction to be given to a rule of the
Municipal Court of Chicago. Since this rule was similar in content to the former
Civil Practice Act provision set forth in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188,
the case might be said to be a precedent for a similar holding in a state court. It
might be noted that Section 64 of the Revised Civil Practice Act, while recognizing
the right of a defendant to demand trial by jury after the plaintiff has waived his
earlier request, provided the defendant does so "promptly after being advised of
the waiver," is silent on the specific point at hand.
44 See post, this division, note 71, for a discussion of the case of Geneva Con-
struction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 4 Ill. (2d) 273, 122 N. E. (2d) 540
(1954), one dealing with the right to add new parties plaintiff, after the limitation
period has run, to a suit brought within the permitted time.
45 4 Ill. (2d) 342, 122 N. E. (2d) 513 (1954), affirming 2 Ill. App. (2d) 182, 119
N. E. (2d) 1 (1954), noted in 32 CHIOAGO-KENT LAW REvnIw 346.
46 Laws 1949, p. 816: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953. Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135. The limitation
period for suits of this character was, in 1955, reduced from two years to one year.
See Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 834; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
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ings not heretofore subject to specific limitation 47 but the princi-
pal point, as to which confusion will exist for the time being,
grows out of some revisions made in the Injuries Act with par-
ticular bearing on suits for wrongful death. In that area, the
legislature enacted, and the Governor signed, two separate bills
the earlier of which, while making a change in the matter of the
effect to be given to contributory negligence on the part of a
statutory beneficiary, preserved the one-year limitation period
heretofore existing.4 The later measure, in addition to making
changes not here pertinent, prescribed a two-yeax limitation
period.49 Until the conflict between these bills is resolved, per-
haps by the passage of amendatory legislation, attorneys would
be wise to obviate any question by seeing to it that all wrongful
death cases are instituted well within the shorter of the two
periods.
The proper or improper selection of parties, both plaintiff
and defendant, could have profound consequences on the out-
come of planned litigation. While the statute law on the subject
remains generally the same as heretofore, the Civil Practice
Act has been revised to the extent that (1) judgments in suits
brought by subrogees shall not hereafter operate to the prejudice
of subrogors who may be entitled to rely on other causes growing
out of the transaction in question, 50 (2) specific provision has now
been made for the use of third-party practice without changing
the law in relation to contribution, indemnity or the like,5 (3) the
subject of intervention has been codified in a manner analogous to
the federal rule relating thereto," (4) as is also true with respect
47 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 127; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955. Vol. 2, Ch. 83, §§ 24d-24e.
A seven-year limitation has now been imposed on suits based upon Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 10 et seq., relating to fraudulent devises, and a two-year
limitation has been established against suits to enforce contracts to make wills.
These periods may be shortened in the event appropriate steps are taken, in the
manner directed by the Administration Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 344
et seq., to fix a time for the filing of claims against estates.
48 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 565; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
49 Laws 1955, p. H-, . B. No. 777: ibid., Ch. 70, § 2.
50111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 22(4).
51 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 25(2).
52 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 26.1. Compare with Fed. Rules Civ. Pro., Rule 24.
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to matters of interpleader,53 and (5) suits against a partnership
may now be directed against the entity by its firm name.54
Content has been added to this area of the subject as the result
of a few judicial decisions. The holding in Shelton v. Sulek55
is difficult to understand for the plaintiff in that action, a real
estate broker, had taken judgment by confession as payee of a
negotiable note, used to serve as a temporary binder in lieu of a
cash deposit under a real estate sale contract, but was there de-
clared not to be the proper party to sue on the note for lack of a
suable interest. Since the Illinois Civil Practice Act lacks a "real
party in interest" provision5 and directs that, as to all matters
not regulated, the practice at common law or in equity should
prevail,57 the decision would seem to be erroneous on its face for
the opinion does not disclose that the plaintiff's name, as payee
in the note, was qualified in any respect and nothing would seem
to be more certain than that a promisee is a proper party to sue
on a contract.
The right of a private individual to serve as relator in a quo
warranto proceeding is conditioned upon the terms of the specific
statute58 and such a person is generally deemed to be unqualified
as possessing no right separate and distinct from that of the
general public is whose name the action is maintained. Where a
55 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 26.2. Heretofore, interpleader could only take place in Illinois
in relation to equity proceedings. The revision now gives the state a modern form
of practice, one which also eliminates the old distinctions between bills of inter-
pleader and bills in the nature of bills of interpleader. The new practice provision
specifically recognizes the right of a defendant to use a counterclaim for this pur-
pose. On that point, see Curran v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 348 Ill. App. 210,
108 N. E. (2d) 729 (1952).
54 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 27.1. It should be noted that the section so added is limited
to suits against the partnership so it is to be presumed that the old law continues
with respect to partners suing as plaintiffs. The contractual obligations of the
partners are declared, by ibid., Ch. 110, § 27, to be both joint and several in char-
acter and, by the same section, it would now appear to be possible to combine more
than one but less than all joint obligors in the same suit.
55 5 Ill. App. (2d) 186, 125 N. E. (2d) 313 (1955).
56 The sale contract did, however, contain a provision to the effect that the
earnest money, on default, could be appropriated first to the seller's expenses, if
any, and then to the "payment of said commission," so it could be said that the
broker possessed an interest of a sort.
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 1.
58 Ibid., Ch. 112, § 10.
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distinct interest can be demonstrated to exist, however, the private
individual may utilize this method of procuring relief so it became
necessary, in two cases, to resolve a question as to the right of
the relator to conduct the proceedings. In People ex rel. Mc-
Carthy v. Firek,59 the Supreme Court, following a lengthy dis-
cussion of the point, held that a taxpayer in a sanitary district
had both a personal and substantial distinct interest entitling him
to act. The problem in People ex rel. J. H. Anderson Monument
Company v. Rosehill Cemetery Company ° was not quite so simple
for the relator there was a monument dealer who sought to ques-
tion the right of a cemetery to engage in the business of selling
monuments and markers for installation in the cemetery and
whose principal basis for complaint lay in the degree of competi-
tion which it faced by reason of its location across the street from
the cemetery." A majority of the Supreme Court judges, on
the strength of the substantial decrease in business shown to have
been produced by the competition so generated, held the relator
had a peculiar interest in the situation hence had a right to con-
duct the suit.
One interesting point concerning the right to maintain repre-
sentative proceedings was made in the case of Smyth v. Kaspar
American State Bank.6' Following the closing of the bank there
concerned, certificates of beneficial interest were issued to the de-
positors, payable out of future recoveries and net profits before
dividends in the reorganized institution. From realizations on
frozen assets, a final liquidating dividend was tendered to the cer-
tificate holders, some of whom accepted and surrendered their
certificates, made a condition to the distribution, but others of
whom rejected the tender and retained their certificates. Mem-
59 5 Ill. (2d) 317, 125 N. E. (2d) 637 (1955).
603 Il1. (2d) 592, 122 N. E. (2d) 283 (1954), noted in 33 GHICAG0-KENT LAW
REVIEw 344 and 43 Ill. B. J. 383. Hershey, J., wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Fulton, J., concurred. Klingbiel, J., also wrote a dissenting opinion.
61 A competitor, as such, Is not ordinarily permitted to assert that a competing
corporation is engaging in ultra vires conduct: Golconda Northern Ry. v. Gulf
Line R. Co., 265 Ill. 194, 106 N. E. 818 (1914).
626 Ill. App. (2d) 64, 127 N. E. (2d) 149 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
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bers of each group, purporting to represent the two classes, joined
in a proceeding to compel the bank to pay the unsatisfied balances
from subsequent earnings. The Appellate Court for the First
District initially held that a representative suit was proper on
behalf of those who had retained their certificates, since the pur-
pose of the action was one to establish a common fund from
which their claims could be satisfied, but said that, as to the
others, representation was not possible for their claims to re-
instate their certificates rested on fraud or duress, hence were
personal in character. On rehearing, however, the court con-
cluded that the basis for the demands of the holders who had sur-
rendered their certificates rested primarily on mistake, rather
than fraud or duress, for which reason, no conflict of interest
appearing, the combination of the two sets of claims in the one
suit and the conduct thereof by bona fide representatives of each
group of claimants was not improper.
Attempts to bring new parties into pending litigation3 led
to three interesting holdings, two of which have made drastic
change in the prior law on the subject. The decision in Hurley
v. Finney,"' while correct on the basis of the law as it stood at the
time of the decision, reflects a situation which, it is to be hoped,
has now been cured by Section 26.1 of the Revised Civil Practice
Act.6  An insurer was there denied the right to intervene in a
pending law action affecting the insured-defendant for the pur-
pose of securing a declaratory judgment as to its rights and obli-
gations under the policy, particularly since the intervention, if
permitted, would lead to the formulation of new and different
63 Some revision has been made in this connection in former Section 25 of the
Civil Practice Act, particularly with respect to the proposition as to when the
action can be said to be commenced, for purpose of limitation, against a new party
added as a defendant. See note in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 170 (1946), dis-
cussing the effect of the case of Piper v. Epstein, 326 Il1. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d)
139 (1945), but note the change made by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 25(3).
64 6 Ill. App. (2d) 23, 126 N. E. (2d) 513 (1955).
65 The Joint Committee comment to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § -26.1,
indicates a purpose to permit intervention to "avoid relitigation in another suit of
issues which are being litigated In a pending suit." It must be noted, however, that
the situation in the case at hand does not fall squarely within the categories
described in Section 26.1, paragraphs 1 to 4 inclusive.
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issues60 and also cause the court, in a suit where service and juris-
diction depended on a non-resident's use of a state highway,'
7
to rule on causes of action not directly connected with the use
made of the highway.6
Far more important is the holding of the Supreme Court in
the case of Johnson v. Moon69 for the court there, by stretching
statutory language for the addition of new parties as needed for
a "complete determination" of the controversy, 70 achieved a
result under which the choice of parties no longer rests in the
hands of the plaintiff but is open to revision at the election of a
defendant who files a counterclaim, provided the claim so asserted
grows out of the transaction which forms the basis of the suit.
It was there said that if the plaintiff, in a tort case, chooses to
bring in only certain of the tort-feasors, any defendant already
before the court may force the addition of those not originally
made parties to the suit.
Equally remarkable is the result finally attained in the case of
Geneva Construction Company v. Martin Transfer & Storage
Company.71 While the decision, to some degree, reflects the court's
concern with respect to the impact made on the rights of injured
employees because of a prior holding interpreting a provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Act,72 the determination therein
opens a vista to a possible means to circumvent applicable stat-
66 By Section 26.1 of the Revised Civil Practice Act, the trial judge, in the order
allowing intervention, is permitted to exercise a degree of discretion as to the
terms to be imposed.
67 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 23.
68 See, in that connection, the case of Dart Transit Co., Inc. v. Wiggins, 1 Ill.
App. (2d) 126, 117 N. E. (2d) 314 (1954).
693 Ill. (2d) 561, 121 N. E. (2d) 774 (1954), reversing 1 Ill. App. (2d) 6, 116
N. E. (2d) 95 (1953). See also Zacharias, "Illinois Concepts Concerning Joinder
of Parties and Causes," 33 CMCOAGo-KENT LAW REmvrw 118-47 (1955).
70 The holding interpreted Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 149. The only
revision made in this section, so far as here applicable, was of purely textual
character: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 25.
714 Ill. (2d) 273, 122 N. B. (2d) 540 (1954), affirming 351 Ill. App. 289, 114 N. E.
(2d) 906 (1953).
72 See Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952),
noted in 30 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REvIrw 375, which deals with the right of an in-
jured covered employee to sue a third person who caused the injury in a common
law action for damages.
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utes of limitation by the simple process of adding extra plaintiffs
to a pending suit. The action there had been instituted in prompt
time by an employer who was seeking to recover from a third
person for money paid out for workmen's compensation benefits
to an injured employee. More than two years after institution
of the suit and over four years after the date of the injury,73
the employee, on learning of his right to maintain his own suit,74
secured leave to intervene and filed an amended complaint in which
his personal claims were added to those of his employer. A judg-
ment for plaintiffs on the complaint as amended was affirmed,
despite defense insistence on the bar by limitation, when the court
held that the amendment provision of the Civil Practice Act was
broad enough to permit the introduction of additional parties
plaintiff. It was also held that the complaint, when so amended,
related back to the date of the original filing of the suit inasmuch
as the amended claim grew out of the same transaction or oc-
currence as that set forth in the original pleading.7 5 One is left
to speculate whether the same result would follow if one person,
harmed in an accident injuring multiple parties, were to begin
suit promptly and the other injured persons, each pursuing his
own independent claim growing out of the occurrence, should long
afterward seek to participate in the case. To say, as the court
there did, that it is the basic policy, by requiring prompt suit, to
see to it that the defendant is afforded a "fair opportunity to
investigate the circumstances upon which liability against him is
predicated,""8 which policy is served if one party has sued on the
facts, leads to the disregard of another policy against clogging
the courts with stale claims.
78 A two-year limitation would prevent the bringing of an independent suit: Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 15. See also Govedarica v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 F.
(2d) 499 (1954), where, on comparable facts, the injured employee was denied the
right to sue because his claim had become barred and there was, apparently, no
pending action in which he could intervene.
74 The case of Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., cited in note 72 ante, was decided
in the interim between the employee's injury and his application for permission to
intervene.
75 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 170, as now amended by Section 46 of the
Revised Civil Practice Act, particularly paragraph 2.
784 Ill. (2d) 273 at 289-90, 122 N. E. (2d) 540 at 549.
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Nothing has been done to change the law relating to the nature
of legal remedies7 7 but issues with regard to the scope of equitable
and statutory remedies do still arise. Equity jurisdiction, of
course, depends upon the inadequacy of a remedy at law. The
problem came up, therefore, in the case of Lackey v. Pulaski Drain-
age District,7 as to whether equity should assume jurisdiction to
enjoin against the collection of drainage assessments where the
basis for suit was not the absence of authority to make the levy
but rather one as to alleged irregularities in the exercise of such
authority. It was held that, as the remedy by way of quo warranto
was proper and adequate, the granting of equitable relief would be
improper. In Pierce v. Pierce7 9 however, the court found an
independent equitable jurisdiction to exist in matters of partition
and, on the basis thereof, upheld a decree directing partition of a
long-term leasehold interest.
Purely political rights will not be enforced or protected in
equity so, in People ex rel. Carter v. Hurley,0 it was held improper
to grant even temporary relief by way of injunction in a proceeding
where mandamus was the proper form of remedy and the relator
also sought relief of that nature. While older ideas in that area
die slowly, despite a provision in the statute on mandamus assimi-
lating the practice therein to that followed in other civil cases,81
it is cheering to note that, in the case of American Civil Liberties
Union v. City of Chicago,82 wherein a violation of a civil as distinct
from a political right was involved, the court found no objection
77 See post, Division II, Contracts, notes 30 to 32, for the case of People v. Rocco,
4 I. App. (2d) 238, 124 N. E. (2d) 25 (1955), which holds that a suit in debt may
not be maintained on a criminal recognizance, the statutory remedy under Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 625 et seq., being there declared to be the exclusive
remedy.
784 111. (2d) 72, 122N. E. (2d) 257 (1954).
794 I1. (2d) 497, 123 N. E. (2d) 511 (1955), affirming 351 Ill. App. 336, 115 N. E.
(2d) 107 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 265.
804 il. App. (2d) 24, 123 N. E. (2d) 341 (1954). See also Malkin v. City of
Chicago, 6 Ill. App. (2d) 151, 127 N. E. (2d) 145 (1955), wherein an attempt to
combine claims in mandamus with prayers for declaratory relief was criticized.
81 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 87, § 11. There is authority, in Section 44 of
the Civil Practice Act, for the joinder of legal and equitable claims in one suit.
823 fI1. (2d) 334, 121 N. E. (2d) 585 (1954). Further appeal has been dismissed:
348 U. S. 979, 75 S. Ct. 572, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 470 (1955).
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to a combination of equitable prayers for relief along with a
request for a declaratory judgment.83
Mention could also be made at this point of two other cases
dealing with declaratory judgment proceedings. It was pointed
out, in Fairbanks Morse & Company v. City of Freeport,84 that
if relief is to be sought by way of declaratory judgment prompt
action to that end is desirable as the opportunity may pass in the
event another court, under some form of conventional action, has
succeeded in gaining jurisdiction over the problem before the
declaratory judgment proceeding is instituted. Perhaps more
significant is the holding of the Appellate Court for the Fourth
District in the case of Burgard v. Mascoutah Lumber Company.5
It was there held that, after a declaration of rights has been
made, either party may petition the court for such further relief
as may be appropriate and, for this purpose, other and separate
pleadings or counterclaims will not be needed. A personal judg-
ment in favor of the defendant against the petitioner for declara-
tory relief was there affirmed, absent any counterclaim, although
the court was careful to note that, while the proceeding may be
docketed as either at law or in equity, close attention must be
given to the right to trial by jury to avoid possible constitutional
questions. It was also there said that, in the event jury trial is
had, the verdict of the jury is not merely advisory in character
but possesses the same effect as a verdict in an action at law.
Other forms of equitable remedies also received attention.
The case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Henriksen, 6
one of first impression in this state, reveals that relief against a
mistake can be secured by way of reformation, despite the pres-
ence of a so-called incontestability clause in an insurance policy,
where through clerical error the policy fails to express the true
83 A proceeding for declaratory judgment, while statutory in character, is essen-
tially equitable in nature. No significant change has been made in the statute
providing for declaratory relief but the same has been renumbered and now appears
as Section 57.1 of the Revised Civil Practice Act.
845 Ill. (2d) 85, 125 N. E. (2d) 57 (1955).
85 6 1il. App. (2d) 210, 127 N. E. (2d) 464 (1955).
86 6 Ini. App. (2d) 127, 126 N. E. (2d) 736 (1955).
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understanding between the parties. Negative restrictive cove-
nants, if reasonable, may be enforced by injunction according to
the case of Bauer v. Sawyer 7 even though the covenant contains
a provision for a penalty in the event of a breach. Attention
could also be drawn to the case of Schien v. City of Virden8" for
the emphasis it puts on the matter of the summary assessment of
damages incurred by reason of the wrongful issuance of a tem-
porary injunction."9 According to that case, it is a condition
precedent to the assessment of damages that the temporary in-
junction be demonstrated to have been wrongfully issued. If, there-
fore, a motion to dissolve has been denied and no appeal has been
taken from that order,90 the order for temporary injunction be-
comes final and precludes the possibility of an assessment of
damages regardless of the final outcome of the case. 1
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS
Very little has been said or done in relation to the content,
form, or the manner of setting forth the claim upon which the
civil action is based although it should be noted that there is
now a specific prohibition against the use of the several common
counts in actions heretofore sounding in general assumpsit.
92
It would seem from the case of Steward v. Bartley, 3 however,
that the bar has not yet become fully conversant with the fact
that, in actions resting on wilful and wanton conduct, the plaintiff
876 Ill. App. (2d) 178, 126 N. E. (2d) 844 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
88.5 111. (2d) 494, 126 N. E. (2d) 201 (1955).
89 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1. Ch. 69, § 12, authorizes the court, in the Instances
there mentioned, to act upon a suggestion of damages but specifies that the failure
to do so does not operate to bar an action on the injunction bond.
90 An appeal from an interlocutory order of this character is permitted by Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 78.
91 Supplementing earlier opinions in the same case wherein attempts to recover
damages for the wrongful issuance of an injunction growing out of a labor dispute
had proved to be ineffective, the current holding in United Mail Order, etc., Union
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ill. App. (2d) 477, 128 N. E. (2d) 645 (1955), now
establishes the fact that, in a suit on an injunction bond, the judgment cannot
exceed the penal sum named therein for this is the extent of the contractual
liability assumed thereunder.
92 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 33(1).
93 5 Ill. App. (2d) 208, 124 N. E. (2d) 899 (1955).
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must now94 allege freedom from wilful and wanton conduct on
his part if the complaint is to be considered sufficient to withstand
a motion to strike. Fortunately for the plaintiff there concerned,
no question was raised over the omission of this essential alle-
gation, until after trial and verdict so it was possible, through the
use of the principle of aider by verdict, for the court to conclude
that allegations as to freedom from contributory negligence plus
allegations that the plaintiff had warned the defendant about his
reckless conduct were enough to support the judgment.95 Re-
minder is also given, by the case of Fowley v. Braden,96 that
exhibits attached to pleadings are a part thereof for all purposes
9 7
so reference may be made thereto to determine whether incon-
sistency lies between the allegations of the complaint, or the
theory thereof, and the verbiage or nature of the exhibit.98 Verifi-
cation of a complaint should, according to Petru v. Petru,"9 be no
idle gesture to be lightly undertaken for the court there indicated
that a complete abandonment of charges contained in a sworn com-
plaint could well go a long way to impair confidence in the veracity
of the plaintiff as a witness.
Mention has been made of some problems arising from the
joinder of parties in a suit.1 Of related character is the matter
of joining a series of distinct claims. In that connection, specific
statutory authority now exists for the inclusion in one case of
a series of related claims even though certain of them may not be
cognizable until others of the series have been prosecuted to con-
94 The allegation was first considered to be essential in the case of Prater v.
Buell, 336 Ill. App. 533, 84 N. E. (2d) 676 (1949).
95 The court specifically stated that It expressed no opinion on the point as to
whether the complaint would have survived a motion under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 45, if such a motion had been presented in timely fashion.
96 4 Ill. (2d) 355, 122 N. E. (2d) 559 (1954).
97 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 36.
98 The complaint in question proceeded on the theory that a joint venture existed
between the parties. The exhibits tended to indicate the arrangement was no more
than a contract for the rendition of services.
994 Ill. App. (2d) 1, 123 N. E. (2d) 352 (1954).
1 See above, this section, notes 50 to 76 inclusive.
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clusion.2 The case of LaPlaca v. LaPlaca would indicate that the
Supreme Court is also willing to permit an action to be expanded
beyond normal scope so as to be made to cover unrelated claims,
at least so long as the parties made no protest," but the Appellate
Courts have tended to place narrow limits around the degree of
joinder which will be permitted, particularly when protest is made
and the joined claims are of unusual nature." Care should be
exercised, therefore, before too great a reliance is placed on the
language of the Civil Practice Act relating to this point.6
Nothing of consequence has been done to change the rules
relating to defensive pleadings7 but attention might be given to
three cases which throw light on the subject of affirmative defenses.
There is indication, in the case of McClean v. Chicago Great West-
ern Railway Company,s that a person relying on an act of God
to defeat tort liability should plead the same affirmatively, prob-
ably because it would be one of those defenses "likely to take
2 Section 44 of the Revised Civil Practice Act now so declares, using an illustra-
tion of a case wherein the plaintiff joins a cause of action for damages with one
to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance in the manner permitted by Fed.
Rules Civ. Pro., Rule 18(b). Heretofore, two separate suits would have been needed
to accomplish complete relief.
as 5 I. (2d) 468, 126 N. E. (2d) 239 (1955).
4 The case began as a suit for separate maintenance but ended up as a partition
proceeding on a counterclaim filed for that purpose. No objection appears to have
been made that the issues in a statutory proceeding for separate maintenance
should be kept within proper limits: Petta v. Petta, 321 Ill. App. 512, 53 N. E. (2d)
324 (1944), noted in 22 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REvIEW 281.
I See Johnson v. Johnson, 5 Ill. App. (2d) 453, 125 N. E. (2d) 843 (1955), in
which old rules as to multifariousness were invoked to prevent the combination in
one suit of three distinct claims for partition where the titles to the three parcels
did not arise from a common source and there was a degree of lack of identity as
to the co-tenants, the Second District there holding that, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 44 et seq., joinder would be permitted only if the several titles
were derived from a common source or all co-tenants were interested In all of the
parcels. See also People ex rel. Carter v. Hurley, 4 Ill. App. (2d) 24, 123 N. E.
(2d) 341 (1954), where the First District held it improper to join equitable claims
with demands for mandamus on the authority of some older cases decided long
before the adoption of the Civil Practice Act.
6111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§43(1) and 44(1).
7 Section 41 of the Civil Practice Act has been amended so as to provide that, in
the event allegations and denials have been made without reasonable cause and not
in good faith, the pleader thereof shall pay, in addition to all reasonable expenses,
reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed by the court: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 41.
83 Ill. App. (2d) 235, 121 N. E. (2d) 337 (1954).
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the other party by surprise." 9 The defense of illegality, however,
is specifically declared to be an affirmative defense so, in Bauer v.
Sawyer,'0 the defendant was denied the right to rely on an alleged
illegal restraint in the contract sued upon because first, he had
not set forth this defense in his answer, and second, he had not
sustained the burden of proof which rested on him in this respect.
The defendant in Whitsel v. County of Cook" specifically pleaded
the defense of res judicata, electing to stand thereon when the
answer was stricken on motion, but lost on appeal because the
higher court came to the conclusion that a second suit between the
same parties, or their privies, in the former action actually in-
volved different, although somewhat related, issues. 2
Motion practice, both with respect to the manner of raising
objections to pleadings and as to termination of the suit because
of the presence of certain defects or defenses, has been subjected
to a degree of statutory revision. In addition to changes in
verbiage, a new subsection has been added to Section 45 of the
Civil Practice Act to make it clear that, among other forms of
motion, one seeking judgment on the pleadings would be of proper
character. 8 More substantial revision has been made in Section
48 for, in addition to expanding the scope of the motion thereunder
to apply to third-party proceedings,'14 the permissible grounds for
relief now extend to cases wherein either plaintiff or defendant
9 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 43(4). The discussion of the point Is by
way of dicta, however, for the plaintiff did not object, because of any lack of
affirmative pleading, to the introduction of defense testimony to support this
contention.
106 Ill. App. (2d) 178, 126 N. E. (2d) 844 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
114 Ill. (2d) 269, 122 N. E. (2d) 564 (1954), noted in 1955 Ill. L. Forum 173.
12 The earlier case, that of Galt v. County of Cook, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N. E. (2d)
395 (1950), had dealt with the validity of a 130 foot set-back line imposed by a
county zoning ordinance. The current action, involving the same and some addi-
tional property was directed against an 80 foot set-back line provision found In the
same section of the same ordinance. This, the court said, constituted an independ-
ent cause of action.
18 Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 45(5). Statutory recognition Is thereby
given to what has, heretofore, been held to be an appropriate form of attack:
Milanko v. Jensen, 404 Ill. 261, 88 N. E. (2d) 857 (1949).
14 Prior to this the Section 48 motion ran only against the complaint or the
counterclaim: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172.
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lacks legal capacity, 5 the claim has been extinguished by discharge
in bankruptcy, 6 or other affirmative matters exist which could
serve to avoid the legal effect of, or defeat, the claim or demand. 7
The court is not limited, as heretofore, to considering simply the
affidavits' s offered in support of a motion under this Section but
may also now receive "other proof," presumably intended to in-
clude oral testimony, in much the same way as would be done in
connection with hearings on petitions for temporary restraining
orders or the like.
Despite the distinctions which have, for a long time, existed
between the two motion sections of the Civil Practice Act, it is
evident that courts, as well as lawyers, often fail to observe these
distinctions and grant relief under one form in a manner which
would be proper only with respect to the other and vice versa.
Thus, in Davis V. Foreman,9 a motion to strike a complaint on the
ground it contained false, impertinent and scandalous matter, one
which could only be offered under Section 45 of the statute, 0
was submitted with supporting affidavits, so as to be a form of
"speaking" demurrer, and was upheld despite the fact that a
motion of this type is permitted only under Section 48 and then
only if it rests upon one or more of the grounds there enumerated.
By contrast, in the case of Nordland v. Poor Sisters of St. Joseph
of Perpetual Devotion,2' the Appellate Court for the First Dis-
trict appears to have fallen into an error of a type previously
noted,22 that of permitting the use of a motion to dismiss, based
on Section 48 but specifying that the plaintiff lacked the right to
sue, whereas, by that section, such a motion would lie only in
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 48(1) (b).
16 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 48(1) (f).
17 Ibid., Oh. 110, § 48(1) (1).
I8 See also revised Rule 15 of the Illinois Supreme Court.
19 6 Ill. App. (2d) 343, 127 N. E. (2d) 503 (1955).
20 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 45(1), which specifies that the
grounds for the motion shall be stated therein and lists, among possible forms of
relief, that "designated immaterial matter be stricken out."
214 Ill. App. (2d) 48, 123 N. E. (2d) 121 (1954), noted in 33 CHICAo-KF.T LAw
REmw 280.
22 Classen v. Heil, 330 Ill. App. 433, 71 N. E. (2d) 537 (1947), note in 36 Ill. B. J.
194.
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cases where the defect is one bearing on the plaintiff's capacity
to sue. In the case of F & F Laboratories v. Chocolate Spraying
Company,3 the court appears to have expanded the statutory
ground for dismissal under Section 48, provided it can be shown
that there is another action pending between the same parties, by
upholding the dismissal of a counterclaim2 4 because the demand
there asserted had already been placed in litigation, although
there was a failure to show full compliance with restrictions
heretofore existing on the right to seek abatement of a cause for
this reason.2 5  More in harmony with statutory concepts is the
decision reached in Holland v. Richards26 where the court said
it was appropriate to use a motion to dismiss because of laches,
provided the defect appeared on the face of the complaint, de-
spite an objection that the party was limited to the sole remedy
of raising this point by way of an affirmative defense in an
answer.2
Defects in pleadings may, of course, be cured by amendment.2
While little has been said on that score, 29 the case of Martin v.
Kozjak80 should evoke a degree of interest for it was there held
23 6 Ill. App. (2d) 299, 127 N. E. (2d) 682 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 48(2), extends this form of motion prac-
tice to any party "against whom a claim or demand is asserted."
25 Allen v. Watt, 69 Ill. 655 (1873) ; McJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 486 (1851).
264 Ill. (2d) 570, 123 N. E. (2d) 731 (1955).
27 A point was urged In the case of McWane Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 3 Ii1. App. (2d) 399, 122 N. E. (2d) 435 (1954), but not determined
because not properly preserved for review, that a motion pursuant to Section 45
of the Civil Practice Act was insufficient because It failed to point out wherein the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. The motion did say that the complaint
was "insufficient in law, being contrary to and in derogation of the provisions of"
the statute cited, although it did not point out, with particularity, that there had
been a failure to allege compliance with certain notice provisions contained in the
statute. One is left to speculate as to how much notice a pleader is entitled to
have with respect to defects in his pleadings.
28 By an addition to Section 46(1) of the Civil Practice Act, a bill of particulars,
as well as other pleadings, may be amended. On that point, see McNeff v. White
Eagle Brewing Co., 294 Ill. App. 37, 13 N. E. (2d) 493 (1938).
29 But see above, this section, note 71, first series, for the remarkable holding in
the case of Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 4 Ill. (2d)
273, 122 N. E. (2d) 540 (1954), regarding the right to add new parties plaintiff, by
amendment, after running of the statute of limitations. See also the rather exten-
sive revision made in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 48(4), dealing with the
relation back of amended pleadings to overcome, to some degree, the holding in
Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 Ill. 203, 20 N. E. (2d) 280 (1939).
30 5 Ill. App. (2d) 390, 125 N. E. (2d) 690 (1955).
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to be error to deny to a defendant permission to amend an an-
swer, which had initially admitted possession and control of the
premises out of which the injury arose, when it was later discov-
ered that another, in fact, had all the time been responsible for
the control and maintenance of the property. The fact that it was
too late for the plaintiff to do anything to cure the defect by way
of proceeding against the third persons ' was said not to be
material inasmuch as, if the point had been promptly made in the
original answer, any such remedy would, by then, have likewise
been barred.3 2  It should be noted that there was nothing in the
record of the case to indicate collusion between the defendant and
the third person to suppress the defense. If collusion had been
present, a denial of the right to amend might have been supported
on the basis that a trial judge is permitted to exercise a degree
of discretion by imposing "just and reasonable terms" on the
privilege of amendment.s3
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE
Antecedent to the trial itself, some questions may be gen-
erated regarding such things as summary judgment procedure,
pre-trial discovery and the like. In that connection, it should be
noted that a trial ought not take place until the pleadings have
been completely made up and issues have been reached there-
under. It was for this reason that the default divorce decree in
favor of the plaintiff entered in the case of McKeon v. McKeon 3
was ordered set aside as the plaintiff there had neglected to file
a reply or answer to the defendant's counterclaim3 5 and, when
the case was called for trial, the full pleading record had not
31 See Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Jerka, 227 Il. 95, 81 N. E. 7 (1907).
32 In Marsden v. Neisius, 5 Ill. App. (2d) 396, 126 N. E. (2d) 44 (1955), a late
amendment designed to correct the name of the defendant was held to relate back
and thereby obviate a possible defense based on the Limitation Act.
83 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 46(1).
344 Ill. App. (2d) 515, 124 N. E. (2d) 564 (1955).
35 An answer to a counterclaim Is now specifically required by Section 38(4) of
the Revised Civil Practice Act. Heretofore, the requirement depended on an infer-
ence based on Section 32 thereof, which called for a reply in the event "new matter
by way of defense" appeared in the answer.
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then been completed.36  After all pleadings are on file, there is
still opportunity, prior to trial and with court approval, to with-
draw an existing pleading and substitute some appropriate mo-
tion in lieu thereof, one which might have been presented earlier
and which, if allowed, might serve to make trial unnecessary.
The case of Kovalik v. Baldwin, 7 while pointing out that a request
of this nature should be given liberal consideration, unless the
opposing party could show a loss of rights or damage in some
respect from the granting thereof, nevertheless criticizes the prac-
tice as being entirely inappropriate where the proposed motion
is one to dismiss the suit and would require, for its determina-
tion, a resolution of disputed issues of fact, particularly where
a trial by jury would be proper and had been demanded.
Control over the matter of voluntary dismissal of proceed-
ings has been, since 1933, in the hands of the courts and has not
been one left to the untrammelled judgment of the litigant. 9 The
holding in the case of Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 40 however, would
indicate that a clear-cut exception exists in the event the suit is
one for divorce or separate maintenance. It was there held to be
error, after trial and finding in favor of the counterclaimant, to
deny such a party the privilege of foregoing a determination in
his favor under penalty of dismissal of his claims with prejudice.
A public policy designed to protect the continuance of the mar-
riage relation was said to be adequate justification for the crea-
tion of this exception and to outweigh any counter policy in-
36 The court there also held that, under Rule 21 of the Superior Court of Cook
County. it was error to dispense with notice to the opposite party, who had entered
an appearance, of the proposed submission of the decree for judicial approval.
373 111. App. (2d) 210, 121 N. E. (2d) 53 (1954), noted in 33 CIiCAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 191.
38 Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act htis been amended, in this respect, to re-
quire denial of a motion to dismiss in suits at law where a jury demand has been
filed only in those instances where "a material and genuine disputed question of
fact" has been raised by the pleadings. Heretofore, the presence of any "disputed
questions of fact" would have been enough to preclude the court from granting a
motion of this nature: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172.
39 Section 52 of the Civil Practice Act has now been enlarged so as to extend to
counterclaimants and third-party plaintiffs, as well as to original plaintiffs. A
companion section, based on Fed. Rules Civil Pro., Rule 23(c), has been enacted to
cover compromise and dismissal of class suits: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 52.1.
406 Ill. App. (2d) 310, 127 N. E. (2d) 673 (1955).
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tended to bring litigation to a speedy and final determination ac-
cording to the substantive rights of the parties.
4 1
Summary judgment and pre-trial procedure, as well as dis-
covery and deposition practices, have been subjected to extensive
revision, both by statutory changes and revision of court rules.
42
Any enumeration of the changes so made would result in undue
extension of this survey, so the most that could be said now is
that, to a large extent, the state practice will follow closely, if not
parallel, the federal rules on the subject and, in all probability,
federal decisional interpretation thereof will be found helpful,
if not controlling, in doubtful instances. For the purpose of
bringing the entire law on the subject together at one place, some
sections have been removed from the Evidence Act4 3 and, as
rewritten, are now imbedded in the Revised Civil Practice Act
where they control in matters of discovery, intended to possess
limited use, as well as with respect to evidence depositions, here-
tofore regulated under principles controlling a dedimus potes-
tatem. The explanations and comments of the Joint Commit-
tee, offered in support of these matters, should prove most helpful
to an understanding of, and the possible applications for, these
revisions.
Two cases decided during the year may be of interest in rela-
tion to the matter of assembling proof by way of preparation for
trial. In Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority,44 the Appellate
Court for the First District declared that there was no provision
in law to compel one party, on interrogatory, to furnish to the
other the names and addresses of the witnesses he intends to call.
In Ross v. Wells, 45 however, the same court, in a case of first im-
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 4.
42 Particular attention should be given to Sections 57. 58, 58.1, and 60 of the
Revised Civil Practice Act and to Revised Rules 15 to 22, inclusive, of the Illinois
Supreme Court.
43 Sections 24 to 37 and 40 to 46, inclusive, of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 51,
have been repealed. Section 39 of the Evidence Act, relating to the perpetuation of
testimony, has been recast into a new form effective January 1, 1956.
444 Ill. App. (2d) 222, 124 N. E. (2d) 13 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
456 111. App. (2d) 304, 127 N. E. (2d) 519 (1955).
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pression, required a lawyer, when suing for fees allegedly due,
to produce his client's books and papers in response to a sub-
poena duces tecum served by the client despite the attorney's
claim that he had a right to retain such material in support of
his charging lien. While it could be said that the attorney, by
suing, had recognized that the lien was of little value, hence did
not justify the retention of the client's papers, the court put the
professional duty to make full and frank disclosure with respect
to arrangements between the attorney and his client ahead of
any privilege to insure payment by refusal to surrender in sup-
port of the lien.
In the realm of evidence law, at least as the same related to
proof in civil cases,48 about the only case of significance is that
of KettlewelU v. Prudential Insurance Company, 47 one which pre-
sents no novel propositions of law but does increase the emphasis
on the presumption against suicide and the fact that the burden
of proof is on the insurer to prove that a suicide occurred. The
facts of the case were close, nevertheless the jury came to the
conclusion that it was possible that the insured had come to his
death by carelessness or gross neglect without the intention of
destroying himself. Under this conclusion, the affirmative de-
fense of the insurer that the death was one by suicide was said
not to be proven by "clear and convincing" evidence sufficient to
destroy the presumption.
Trial tactics have not been changed to any appreciable ex-
tent ' but provisions do now exist against the burdensome use of
subpoenas,49 for the impanelling of not to exceed two alternate
jurors, with necessary adjustment as to the number and distribu-
46 Matters of evidence peculiar to criminal cases are discussed below, Division IV,
Criminal Law and Procedure, notes 47 to 57.
474 Ill. (2d) 383, 122 N. E. (2d) 817 (1954), noted in 43 Ill. B. J. 674, reversing
1 Ill. App. (2d) 300, 117 N. E. (2d) 568 (1954).
48 A welcome note has been struck by Supreme Court Rule 14-1, which states
that a "reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule," thereby
indicating an intention to minimize some of the costs heretofore placed on litigants
in equity cases. In that connection, see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 22b,
which directs that, in the trial of a foreclosure suit, the evidence shall be "taken
in open court" except in the instances there mentioned.
49 See Section 62 of the Revised Civil Practice Act.
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tion of peremptory challenges in the event alternate jurors are
used,5" for the giving of an oral charge to the jury if the parties
consent to the use of this method,5' for a reasonable handling of
the matter of preparing, submitting, and the discussion of pro-
posed written instructions,52 for the taking of general verdicts
except where the nature of the case requires the taking of special
verdicts, 58 and for the prompt rendition of judgment upon the
verdict after the same has been attained.
54
While a single post-trial motion will be all that will here-
after be permitted,55 it may be noted that the Supreme Court, in
the case of Fulford v. O'Connor,56 held that it was not unconsti-
tutional to permit a trial court, after verdict had been returned,
to grant a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto at the re-
quest of a defendant 57 without ordering a new trial, despite the
absence of any form of common law procedure to this end, since
the motion, regardless of its present name, was essentially no
more than one for a directed verdict over which the trial judge
had, in a proper case, complete and final power. Having found
that the procedure had been constitutional in character, the court
nevertheless found that the trial judge had decided erroneously
inasmuch as the record contained enough evidence favorable to
the plaintiff to take the case to the jury and, because of a failure
on the part of the defendant to secure the alternative ruling on
the motion for a new trial, 58 the court then ordered the trial judge
to enter judgment on the verdict. In connection with matters of
this character, it is now the law that a plaintiff who consents to
50 Ill. ReV. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 66(2).
51 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 67(1).
52 Ibid., Oh. 110, § 67(3).
53 Ibid., Oh. 110, § 65.
54 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 68(2).
55 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 68.1. By this section, the parties are saved from the possibility
of waiving rights which, heretofore, has occurred in the event the several post-trial
motions were not presented in proper sequence.
563 Ill. (2d) 490, 121 N. E. (2d) 767 (1954), noted in 1954 Ill. L. Forum 710.
57 The relief there granted was based on a construction of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 192. Applicable portions thereof have been carried over into
Section 68.1 of the Revised Civil Practice Act.
58 See former Rule 22 of the Illinois Supreme Court. The text thereof is now
incorporated in Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 68.1(5).
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a remittiturr 9 as a condition to the denial of a new trial is not
barred from asserting error in this respect, in the event of an
appeal by the opposite party, and for this purpose no cross-ap-
peal will be required. 0
Judgment practice has generally been left untouched although
it will hereafter be the case that appeals from final judgments as
to certain, but less than all, of the parties or causes in cases in-
volving multiple parties or causes will be the exception rather
than the rule as an express finding in the judgment order will now
be needed, to the effect that there is no just reason for delaying
enforcement of the partial judgment or the taking of an appeal
thereunder, for support of piece-meal review of a case."' In an
effort to overcome the constitutional difficulties previously noted
operating to nullify the attempted requirement that no default
order or judgment should be entered until after notice had been
given to all parties who had appeared in the case,62 the statute
now provides that the clerk of the court shall give notice after
the fact, presumably with the thought in mind that the error, if
any, may be remedied by prompt application to vacate the default
judgment.63 Mention might also be made of the fact that, in the
case of Bell Discount Corporation v. Pete Weck's Auto Service
Inc., 6 a degree of informality in a judgment order 5 was tolerated
when the court found no uncertainty to exist as the case involved
a single plaintiff and a single defendant and any ambiguity in the
order could be resolved by reference to this fact.
59 The case of Yep Hong v. Williams, 6 Ill. App. (2d) 456, 128 N. E. (2d) 55
(1955), decided subsequent to the period of this survey, contains an interesting point
as to the power of a trial court to impose an additur on a verdict in lien of granting
a new trial.
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 68.1(7). It had previously been the law
that, by entering the remittitur, the party acquiesced in the decision, hence could
not complain of error in this respect: National Castings Co. v. Iroquois Steel &
Iron Co., 333 Ill. 588, 165 N. E. 199 (1929).
61 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 50(2).
62 Laws 1951, p. 1707, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110. § 50a, was declared
unconstitutional in the case of Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N. E.
(2d) 713 (1952), noted In 30 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 383.
63 See Section 50.1 of the Revised Civil Practice Act but note that the failure of
the clerk to give notice does not impair the force of validity of the default order.
64 4 Ill. App. (2d) 397, 124 N. E. (2d) 674 (1954).
65 The order recited that "Judgment be entered for the plaintiff" in a specified
amount but did not state that it was rendered against the defendant nor did it
mention the defendant by name.
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DAMAGES
Three cases appear to have affected the law in relation to
damages during the past year, two of them raising questions as
to whether or not benefits provided by third persons may be con-
sidered in mitigation of the damages suffered. In the first of
these cases, that of Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Com-
pany,66 the Supreme Court held that damages for loss of earnings
should be computed on the basis of gross earnings without any
deductions for federal income taxes and, for that reason, remarks
made by defense counsel before the jury to the effect that an
award of damages would not be subject to income taxation were
considered to be improper. This result seems to be predicated on
two considerations; first, that the disposition made of the dam-
ages paid is of no concern to the defendant, and second, that a
contrary holding would give the defendant a benefit intended by
Congress to accrue to injured parties.
An interesting contrast to this holding is provided by the
case of United Protective Workers of America, Local No. 2 v.
Ford Motor Company,67 wherein an employee had been compul-
sorily retired in violation of a union contract. Between that time
and the time he could have been lawfully retired, he had received
certain social security and annuity payments, the latter provided
by the company for retired employees. In awarding damages,
the court allowed these payments to be deducted from the wages
which would have been earned in accordance with the general rule
of contract damages, to-wit: to place the injured party in the
position he would have been had the contract been performed.
The court refused to extend the rule applicable in tort cases, as
illustrated in the aforementioned case, on the ground that tort
damages involve a flavor of punishment which should find no
665 Ill. (2d) 135, 125 N. E. (2d) 77 (1955), noted in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvEw 377 and 43 Il. B. J. 810. While the review actually occurred with respect
to the holding in 1 Ill. App. (2d) 552, 118 N. E. (2d) 29 (1954), it also, in effect,
reversed the decision rendered on an earlier appeal in the same case, to be found in
349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N. E. (2d) 654 (1953).
67 223 F. (2d) 49 (1955). For a further discussion of this case, see ante, Division
I, Labor Law, note 34.
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place in determining awards for breach of contract. It may be
significant to note that the breach herein was innocent rather
than wilful, having grown out of a misunderstanding of certain
facts, so a degree of inconsistency would appear to be present
particularly since the tort rule apparently makes no such dis-
tinction.
The decision in the case of People ex rel. Schull v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Insurance Company"5 should prove to be
interesting because of its departure from modern practice. The
action was one against a surety on a penal bond and the normal
result, under the terms of the Civil Practice Act, 9 would be the
rendition of a judgment for the face amount of the bond but
with execution issuing only for the actual amount of damages
which the plaintiff proved had been sustained. However, the
Supreme Court held that where a bond has been given to insure
compliance with a statute, as was the case herein, such a bond
is truly penal in nature and the plaintiff need not prove actual
damages but is entitled to an enforcible judgment for the entire
penal sum.
Increases in the amount of damages awardable under two
statutory remedies were effected by the most recent session of the
General Assembly. An amendment, effective July 1, 1956, to Sec-
tion 135 of the Liquor Control Act 70 has raised the amount re-
coverable in dram-shop cases from $15,000 to $20,000, with specific
provision to the effect that such award is available for each person
injured as therein specified. This latter provision amounts to no
more than a legislative confirmation of a result previously
achieved by the Appellate Court in a case based on the statute
as it stood prior to the amendment. 71 In addition, the maximum
amount recoverable in actions brought for wrongful death has
been increased from $20,000 to $25,000, with the exercise by the
684 Ill. (2d) 23, 123 N. E. (2d) 185 (1954). Questions of suretyship law involved
in this case are mentioned above, Division II, Contracts, note 26.
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 53.
70 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 834; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
71 See Childers v. Modglin, 2 Ill. App. (2d) 292, 119 N. E. (2d) 519 (1954).
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legislature of a degree of care to avoid problems heretofore
noted 72 as to whether or not the increase should apply to actions
based on claims arising prior to the amendment.
73
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A few but relatively trivial points were made in the field of
appellate procedure as the result of some decisions attained
during the survey period. After the basic notice of appeal has
been filed in the trial court,7 4 other notices, as to steps taken in
the course of the appeal, are frequently required by statute or
court rule75 but, according to the case of Roesch-Zeller, Inc. v.
Hollembeak,6 none of these other notices possess jurisdictional
importance so the failure to serve the same offers no ground for
dismissal of the appeal in the absence of a showing that the
opposing party has, in some way, been prejudiced by such failure.
In much the same way, a failure to name, in the notice of appeal,
a party to the proceeding who could be adversely affected by
any reversal or modification of the order appealed from7 7 may,
in the fashion noted in the case of Biggs v. Cummins, 7 be obviated
by having such person submit a written waiver of the right to
be so served. If a motion to dismiss has been made, however,
and suggestions have been offered in support thereof and in
opposition thereto,"9 the case of Bramson v. Bramson8s would
72 Laws 1955, p.-, H. B. No. 777; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2. But
there is evidence of lack of care in another direction for the legislature also enacted
H. B. No. 565, one fixing the maximum recovery at $20,000, thereby evidencing an
intention to keep the prior limitation in effect.
78 See the discussion of this point, as It related to an earlier statute, in 27
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIrw 41.
74 The time within which this notice is to be given has been shortened from 90
days to 60 days by Section 76(1) of the Revised Civil Practice Act. Other changes
have also been made In the controlling dates within which varied forms of appellate
action must be taken.
75 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 83, as to notice with
respect to examination of the surety on the appeal bond, or Section 88, as to notice
of filing the mandate, and Supreme Court Rule 36(2) (f), concerning notice of the
filing of the record on appeal.
76 5 IM. App. (2d) 94, 124 N. E. (2d) 662 (1955).
77 This notice requirement appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 34(1).
78 5 In. (2d) 512, 126 N. E. (2d) 208 (1955).
79 See Rule 49 of the Illinois Supreme Court.
804 111. App. (2d) 249, 124 N. E. (2d) 33 (1955). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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indicate that there is no provision in law for the moving party
to file a reply to the suggestions of the opposition and, if such a
reply is filed, it will be stricken from the record.
In only two instances did the courts have anything to say
concerning the order appealed from, one which must, generally, be
of final character and still open to enforcement."' In the case of
LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago,2 the plaintiffs sought
both a declaration that certain frontage consent requirements
in a municipal ordinance were invalid and also an order for a
license to operate a nursing home. The trial court, over the
objection of certain intervening petitioners, granted relief on both
aspects of the case. After an appeal had been taken, the munici-
pality issued the desired license, so plaintiff moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground the case was thereby rendered moot.8 3 The
higher court agreed that, as to the license question, the appeal
had to be dismissed but, since dismissal would have denied the
intervenors of an opportunity to procure consideration of the
other point involved, yet would have left them bound by the trial
court determination which would, on dismissal of the appeal,
have become a res judicata judgment on the merits, it reversed
that portion of the judgment and directed the trial court to dis-
miss the suit. If the order in question, as in the case of Pierce v.
Pierce,4 has been entered by an intermediate reviewing court but
lacks finality because that court has reversed and remanded the
cause for further proceedings, it might still be possible to carry
the case to the Supreme Court if the losing party, by way of
analogy to the practice permitted by Section 75(2)(c) of the
81 See Division IV, Criminal Law and Procedure, at notes 67 to 69, for a discus-
sion of some criminal cases in which review was granted despite the fact the
defendants there concerned had paid the fines or served the sentences imposed.
82 3 Ill. (2d) 375, 121 N. E. (2d) 486 (1954).
83 See also Trust Company of Chicago v. Covnot, 3 Ill. (2d) 553, 121 N. E. (2d)
779 (1954), where an appeal from a judgment in a forcible detainer case was dis-
missed because the tenant had later vacated the premises. By this action, the court
was deprived of jurisdiction to pass on the validity of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1,
Ch. 57, § 17.1, relating to stay of execution.
844 Ill. (2d) 497, 123 N. E. (2d) 511 (1955), affirming 351 Il1. App. 336, 115 N. E.
(2d) 107 (1953).
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Revised Civil Practice Act, 5 will stand by his motion to dismiss
the original appeal and waive the right to have further proceed-
ings taken in the case.
Despite the liberal powers given to reviewing tribunals with
respect to the granting of judgments or the entering of orders
which ought to have been given or entered in the lower courts, 0
parties to an appeal should understand that affirmative relief can
be given only to an appellant unless the other parties, by appro-
priate action, take steps to perfect a cross-appeal.8 7 Because the
plaintiff-appellee had not taken these cautionary measures, the
Supreme Court, in the case of Schmitt v. Heinz,8 although affirm-
ing the decree, held it was without power to pass upon the failure
of the trial judge to assess the amount of damages after granting
reformation of certain deeds because the plaintiff was in no posi-
tion to seek a review of the adverse disposition of this aspect of
the claim.
As most of the other changes made in the statute or court
rules with respect to appellate procedure were adopted to bring
the system into a degree of conformity with the set of uniform
rules for the Appellate Courts,8 9 adopted in 1953, as to which the
bar has now had an opportunity for experience, there is no
occasion to make extended comment with respect thereto. There
will, hereafter, be but one form of review in civil cases, that by
way of notice of appeal, which will encompass all matters formerly
considered under either appeal or writ of error 90 which will be
available as to both earlier forms of review for the same limited
but uniform period of time. 1 The jurisdiction of the reviewing
85111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2. Ch. 110, § 75(2) (c), permits the party to file an
affidavit stating that, on any future trial, he would have no other proof to offer
and requesting the Appellate Court concerned to delete the portion of the decision
remanding the case for further proceedings.
86 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 92(1) (e).
87 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 101.35. But see Supreme Court Rule 32(4) with respect to
appeals taken from an Appellate Court to the Supreme Court.
885 Ill. (2d) 372, 125 N. E. (2d) 457 (1955).
89 These rules appear In 349 Ill. App., pp. xii-lii, inclusive.
90 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 74(1).
91 Ibid., Ch. 110. § 74(3).
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courts will remain as before except that, to support direct appeal
to the Supreme Court in cases involving the validity of municipal
ordinances, in which category county zoning ordinances are also
now included, a certificate by the trial judge that public interest
so requires will hereafter be needed 22 It might also be added that
abstracts and briefs used on appeal will generally be prepared
in the manner previously followed except that, in cases carried
directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right and also in
cases proceeding from the several Appellate Courts other than
by way of leave to appeal, the appellant's brief must, in an
appropriate initial paragraph, disclose the grounds supporting
jurisdiction over the appeal.
93
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Except for a change in the Garnishment Act by which the
size of the wage or salary exemption granted the judgment debtor
has been raised from $30.00 to $35.00 per week,94 and one addition
to the statute relating to judgments and decrees making it
imperative that a judgment debtor seized on a capias ad satis-
faciendum be given an immediate hearing before the court to
permit the quashing of the body execution and the release of the
debtor in a proper case,9 5 the principal alteration in the statutory
law regarding the enforcement of judgments has come about in
the almost total revision made in the statute relating to citation
or supplementary proceedings.9 6 The creditor may now not only
compel discovery of non-exempt assets but may also force the
application thereof toward the payment of the judgment,97 may
require the debtor to apply periodic installments of future income
toward the extinguishment of the indebtedness,98 and may assert
92 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 75(1).
98 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 101.39.
94 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 44; Ii. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 14. The
amendment becomes effective on January 1, 1956.
95 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 67; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 68.
96 See Section 73 of the Revised Civil Practice Act.
97 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 73(2) (a).
98 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 73(2) (b).
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similar rights against third persons who can now be cited into
the proceedings and be subjected to appropriate personal judg-
ments.0 9 Restraining orders of various types are also now per-
mitted. Practice in this area has been further implemented by an
extensive revision of the Supreme Court rule on the point.1
It could be considered appropriate, in closing this portion
of the survey, to note that judgments may sometimes have to
be revived, and sometimes attacked, long after the rendition
thereof. On the first of these points, the case of Smith v. Carlson2
indicates that if a judgment is to be revived under scire facias3
rather than by way of a separate action in debt, it will not be
enough to cause process to be issued and served within the appro-
priate limitation period but, in the language of the statute, the
judgment must have been actually "revived" within that time.
Because, in that case, the twenty-year period had run out between
the issuance of the alias writ of scire facias and the service thereof
on the debtor, it was held proper to dismiss the proceeding for,
while it has been said that a judgment, even in the last agony of
death, has the power to reproduce itself, such renewal of vigor
must come prior to death itself. By contrast, in Davis v. Cohen,
4
the court said it was proper, more than thirty days after a de-
cree of partition had been entered but before the same had been
carried into effect,5 to permit the devisee under a subsequently
discovered will conferring ownership of the real estate on such
devisee to use a bill of review for the purpose of attacking the
partition decree. The ground for attack rested upon newly dis-
covered evidence, for which purpose a showing of diligence would
be needed. The court had no difficulty, on the facts before it, in
99 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 73(2) (c) and § 73(2) (d).
1 Compare revised Rule 24 with I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.26A.
26 Ii. App. (2d) 271, 127 N. E. (2d) 257 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 24b.
4 5 Ill. App. (2d) 517, 126 N. E. (2d) 401 (1955), cause transferred 3 Ill. (2d)
502, 121 N. E. (2d) 741 (1954).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 50(6), permits a court, within thirty days
of rendition, to set aside any final order on any terms or conditions which may be
reasonable.
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finding no negligence on the devisee's part so the heirs at law of
the decedent were deprived of the benefit of the earlier decree
entered in their behalf.
6
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Changes in, as well as interpretations of, the criminal law
of the state have occurred during the period covered by this
survey. In the area of substantive law, it might be noted that
the General Assembly has amended the definition of forcible rape'
by changing the age requirement of offenders from sixteen to
fourteen years; has redefined arson so as to make the crime
extend to the burning of boats or trailers used as dwelling places ;2
and has added television performances to the category of vehicles
by which criminal libel may be disseminated.3  The statute con-
cerning sexual psychopaths4 has been given a general overhaul-
ing, in which connection the most significant amendment has pro-
duced a redefinition of a "sexually dangerous person" so as to
include not only those against whom criminal charges have been
filed but also those who have "demonstrated propensities toward
acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children.'"5
The latter may now be confined even though they are not directly
charged with any criminal offense. Another noteworthy change
in this statute, which previously only provided for an absolute
discharge from detention, now permits the granting of a condi-
tional discharge under the control and supervision of the Director
of Public Safety.6
New provisions have also been added to the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act to prohibit the unauthorized possession, sale or ex-
6 The result could well have been different had the land been sold under the de-
cree prior to the discovery of the will: Ecklund v. Jankowski, 407 Ill. 263, 95 N. E.
(2d) 342 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGo-KEINT LAW RE:IEw 265.
1 Laws 1955, p. H-, . B. No. 791; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 490.
2 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 836; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 48.
3 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 672; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 404.1 et seq.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 820 et seq., as amended by Laws 1955, p.
S. B. No. 490.
5 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 820.01.
6 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 825c.
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change of hypodermic syringes or needles, except by qualified
persons, and records of the sale of these instruments must now
be kept.7 Two new misdemeanors have also been added to the
Criminal Code by the legislature. It is now unlawful for a maga-
zine or book distributor to refuse to furnish magazines or books
to retailers who have refused to stock obscene books offered by
the distributor." By the second, the "remittance agency" busi-
ness has now been specifically declared to be unlawful in recogni-
tion of the fact that, as expressed in the declaration of policy set
forth in the new statute, "persons have held themselves out as
being engaged in the business of accepting money for remittance
to insurance companies, the State and other licensing agencies
without, in fact, being connected in any way therewith and without
remitting as promised."
Turning to the recent decisions of significance, two cases
stand out among all the criminal cases decided during the survey
period involving substantive elements of criminal law. The de-
fendant in People v. Lyons ° had defended a charge of bribery
by asserting that the bribery statute" required both the offeror
and receiver of the bribe to act from corrupt motives and that
he was not guilty as the person tendering the bribe to the de-
fendant was acting solely for the purpose of catching the defend-
ant. This theory of defense found support in the earlier case of
People v. Peters2 but a conviction was upheld when the Supreme
Court, overruling the earlier decision, said that the guilt of the
defendant was not to be measured by the intent of another but
by his own intent.
The second case, that of People v. Lloyd,18 afforded the Appel-
late Court for the Second District with an opportunity to deter-
7 Laws 1955, p. H-, . B. No. 86, I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.33.
8 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 118; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 427a.
9 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 852; Ili. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 498a et seq.
104 Ill. (2d) 396, 122 N. E. (2d) 809 (1954), noted in 1955 Ill. L. Forum 155.
11 The prosecution was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 78.
12265 Ill. 122, 106 N. E. 513 (1914).
133 Ill. App. (2d) 257, 121 N. E. (2d) 329 (1954), noted in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 186.
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mine what a "book" was within the meaning of the provision
making bookmaking a crime.1 ' Though no definitive explanation
of the term came out of the case, the court did determine that the
absence of a written record of the wager was fatal to the state's
case. The underworld will probably be happy to note that the
defendant won a reversal of his conviction because he had, liter-
ally speaking, "used his head."
Other cases are entitled to at least brief mention. The defend-
ant in the case of People v. Guzzardo,15 an alderman, employed a
unique but an ineffective defense to an unlawful assembly charge.
The statute makes it a crime for two or more persons to assemble
for an unlawful purpose and permits "public officers" to direct
such an assembly to disperse. 16 The defendant took the position
that, being an alderman, he was a public officer and, as a public
officer, he was entitled to be present at such an assembly for the
purpose of breaking it up, hence could not be considered to be
among those persons whose conduct was condemned by the statute.
Generously conceding that an alderman could be considered to be
a public officer, the court nevertheless refused to rule that an
alderman could not be one of the other persons referred to, so
it affirmed the conviction.
Another crime calling for participation by more than one
person, that of conspiracy to sell, possess and dispense heroin
in violation of the Uniform Narcotics Drug Act," was charged in
the case of People v. Martin.18 The particular defendant was the
husband of a woman who had been convicted as his co-conspirator.
He sought advantage from this relationship by invoking the com-
mon law fiction that the husband and wife were one, hence could
not combine to commit the crime of conspiracy. As the case was
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 336.
154 11. App. (2d) 355, 124 N. E. (2d) 39 (1955). The case of Poyer v. Boustead,
3 Ill. App. (2d) 562, 122 N. E. (2d) 838 (1954), noted hereafter, would appear to
be a companion case.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 507.
17 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.1 et seq.
184 Ill. (2d) 105, 122 N. E. (2d) 245 (1954), noted in 33 CmcAGo-KENT LAw
ltvrzw 278.
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one of first impression in the state, the Supreme Court evidenced
a preference for the modern view on this subject, refusing to
abide by common law principles. As a consequence, the defend-
ant's conviction was affirmed.
The dual nature of the Illinois statute making the abduction
of an infant into a crime 9 was pointed out in the case of People
v. Savage.20 The defendant there relied on intoxication as a de-
fense to show lack of specific intent. While the court doubted the
sufficiency of the evidence tending to prove this contention, the
defendant was given the benefit of any doubt on the point but the
conviction was sustained because an actual concealment or im-
prisonment was found present and this was considered to be
sufficient to satisfy one aspect of the statutory crime. It may
be noted, therefore, that the crime can be committed either by
one who abducts an infant with intent to conceal or imprison or
by one who does, in fact, do no more than conceal or imprison
without proof of intent.
Essentially the same argument was made in the case of
People v. Vranick.21 There the defendant, charged with the crime
of aiding a prisoner to escape,22 sought reversal of a conviction
on the ground that the prosecution had failed to allege, and prove,
the presence of intent. The court, however, pointed out that
the particular statute could be broken down into three separate
ways by which this crime could be committed, only one of which
would require the presence of an intent. Thus, an aiding of an
escape could be committed if (1) the accused conveyed an instru-
ment into a place of confinement with intent to facilitate a pris-
oner's escape, for which offense an intent was required; but if
the accused (2) aided or assisted a prisoner to escape, or (3) con-
cealed or assisted a prisoner after escape, no intent was required.
As the particular defendant stood charged with aiding and assist-
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 385.
205 I1. (2d) 296, 125 N. E. (2d) 449 (1955).
215 Ill. (2d) 384, 125 N. E. (2d) 513 (1955), cert. den. 349 U. a. 963, 75 S. CL 895,
99 L. Ed. (adv.) 766 (1955).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 228.
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ing in an escape, it was said to be unnecessary to allege or prove
the presence of an intent.
An issue as to whether proof of driving at an excessive
speed without further evidence of negligence would be sufficient
to sustain a conviction under the so-called "reckless homicide"
statute2 3 was presented in the case of People v. Potter.4 The
court there held that such proof, by itself, would not be sufficient
as a matter of law to make the operator of the vehicle guilty of
driving with reckless disregard for the safety of others.
It may not be considered inappropriate to refer to the case
of People v. Hermans2 5 one dealing with the theft of certain
shoats. The opinion therein possesses significance not because
of the profound statements of law expressed but because it rep-
resents as farcical a description of an alleged crime as ever ap-
peared in a judicial opinion. This humorous touch in an other-
wise humdrum case, tending to add a wholesome degree of levity
to the work of the courts, has already made the opinion one of
the minor classics of the bar.
Turning to criminal procedure, the necessity for an actual
physical presence in the demanding state at the time the alleged
crime was committed to support a request for extradition 2 has
proved to be a particularly perplexing problem to the reviewing
courts as may be seen by two cases. In People ex rel. Goshern v.
Babb27 the individual sought was wanted on a charge of non-
support. In People ex rel. Goldstein v. Babb,21 by contrast, the
crime charged was larceny by trick, an offense easily committed
by means of a constructive presence. In both cases, a rather
far-fetched and strained construction was placed on the require-
ment of actual presence so as to make it possible to find that
23 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 364a.
24 5 Ill. (2d) 367, 125 N. E. (2d) 510 (1955).
255 Ill. (2d) 277, 125 N. E. (2d) 500 (1955).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 60, § 2.
274 Ill. (2d) 114, 122 N. E. (2d) 239 (1954).
284 I1. (2d) 483, 123 N. E. (2d) 639 (1954), cert. den. 349 U. S. 928, 75 S. Ot.
771, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 646 (1955).
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the defendants were present in the demanding state during the
commission of the crimes concerned. The problem so presented
emphasizes a sharp need for a change in the law in this area.
Antecedent to prosecution, there is a degree of authority in
law for the taking of fingerprints and of other identification data
from persons apprehended on certain specified offenses, as well
as for the filing of such data, but subject to the requirement that
such records shall be returned to the individual so apprehended
in the event he is later acquitted or released without being con-
victed.29 The statute, however, does not specifically extend to
those held for misdemeanors. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court
for the Second District, in Poyer v. Boustead,30 reached the con-
clusion that no right of an arrested person had been violated,
hence no injunction could be obtained to prevent the circulation
of identification data so taken, even though the petitioner stood
charged with no more than a misdemeanor. The alleged bases for
that holding are open to question3' as it is certain that the prac-
tices there sanctioned do not conform to American principles but
smack strongly of the thing to be expected in a police state.
While no cases of any importance arose involving the former
sufficiency of an indictment, the case of People v. O'Connor3 2
is noteworthy for it was there determined that an apparent am-
biguity in the provisions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
33
as to the place of confinement for a convicted first offender who
possessed narcotic drugs was to be resolved on the basis the
offense was no more than a misdemeanor, hence confinement in
the county jail, even though for more than one year, was not
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 780e.
303 Ill. App. (2d) 562, 122 N. E. (2d) 838 (1954), noted in 33 CmOAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEw 276.
31 See particularly 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RuvIEw 276 at 277-8.
324 Ill. (2d) 403, 122 N. E. (2d) 806 (1954), affirming 350 Ill. App. 212, 112 N. E.
(2d) 489 (1953), to which court the cause had been transferred: 414 Ill. 51, 110
N. E. (2d) 209 (1953).
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.1 et seq. Section 23 thereof was
amended, in 1955, to make the place of confinement for a convicted first offender
specifically in the county jail: Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 277; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 19-9.23. See also comment in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW P.LVIEw 315
(1951), particularly p. 320.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
constitutionally objectionable. While a felony prosecution must,
ordinarily, rest upon an indictment, 84 the use of an information
to charge the offense in question was there held to be proper
and, as a consequence, the Municipal Court of Chicago was held
to be possessed of unquestionable jurisdiction to deal with the
matter.3 5
It should also be noted, in that connection, that the legis-
lature has now provided, except as to the crimes of treason,
murder or manslaughter, that criminal prosecutions may be
based on indictment or, if the defendant is willing to waive in-
dictment, on information. 6 The waiver must be made in open
court but not until after the defendant has been advised as to
the nature of the charge and his rights thereunder. Regardless
of the method used, the felony prosecution must proceed in
conformity with all other statutory requirements such as the
furnishing of a copy of the indictment or information, a list of
the jurors and witnesses, and the like. 7  There is occasion to
believe, despite the desirability of this revision, that the statute
may fall afoul of constitutional objections since legislative au-
thority to deal with the grand jury process is restricted to the
right to "abolish" the grand jury "by law in all cases." ' 38 Similar
reforms initiated in other states have met with both approval and
disapproval.3 9
Points concerning defensive pleas in criminal cases seldom
arise but emphasis was given by the holding in People v. Wash-
34 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8.
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357, gives that court power over offenses
wherein the punishment is "by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the peni-
tentiary."
34 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 809; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 702. See
also revised Rule 26 of the nlinois Supreme Court: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 101.26.
37 The requirement as to furnishing a copy of the charge has been made manda-
tory by a slight legislative revision. See Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 809; Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 729.
38 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8.
39 Compare People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. 111,
61 A. L. R. 793 (1928), with Commonwealth ex rel. Stanton v. Francies, 250 Pa. 496,
95 A. 527 (1915).
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ington,40 in an area where emphasis should hardly be needed,
to the proposition that the statutory requirements describing
the procedure to be followed in the event a plea of guilty is to
be accepted41 are of more than passing consequence. The failure
of the trial judge in that case to explain the nature of the charge,
except for a reference to the counts by number, and a total omis-
sion of any comment as to the scope of the possible punishment
were said to be fatal to the sentence imposed. Even though the
defendant had been represented by counsel, both court-appointed
and of his own choice, the Supreme Court refused to draw any
inference that the guilty plea had been understandingly made,
preferring to place the burden of compliance with the statute on
the shoulders of the trial judge.
In the event trial becomes necessary, the trial judge must
now also be aware that, as the result of the Supreme Court hold-
ing in People v. Spega,42 the defendant possesses a clear-cut
right to waive trial by jury and to insist on a hearing before the
judge alone.43 Prior restraints on this right, to be found in some
earlier cases,44 were there expressly rejected and the earlier cases
were declared overruled. The waiver, once given, according to
People v. Schwartz,45 does not possess conclusive effect so the
defendant may, after reversal of a conviction following trial
before the judge alone, insist on a jury trial at the next hearing.
There would appear to be a divergence in the views followed in
this respect between criminal cases on the one hand and civil
cases on the other.46
Questions relating to proof in criminal cases generated four
405 111. (2d) 58, 124 N. E. (2d) 890 (1955).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 732. The statute is amplified by former
Rule 27A, now Rule 26(3), of the Illinois Supreme Court: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 101.26(3).
425 Ill. (2d) 211, 125 N. E. (2d) 468 (1955), noted in 33 CHICAGO-KzNT L.W
RwvIw 379.
43 See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 736.
44 People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill. 403, 179 N. E. 909, 79 A. L. R. 553 (1932);
People v. Scott, 383 Ill. 122, 48 N. E. (2d) 530 (1943).
45 3 Ill. (2d) 520, 121 N. E. (2d) 758 (1954).
4
6 See Reese v. Laymon, 2 111. (2d) 614, 119 N. E. (2d) 271 (1954), noted in 32
CHIoAGo-KEXT LAw Rzv v 345.
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important decisions. The case of People v. Shambley4" appears
to have engrafted new concepts on the subject of legal and illegal
searches and seizures. A wife had there found it necessary to
call the police for protection against an assault with a gun
threatened by her husband. The husband was arrested and re-
moved from the scene but not until after he had concealed the
weapon in a garage on land owned by the defendant and his wife
as joint tenants. The wife thereafter told the police they could
search the premises and the gun was located. A timely motion
to suppress the weapon as evidence was made and overruled and
the defendant was convicted. His conviction was affirmed, despite
a claim of unlawful search and seizure, on the ground the consent
of the wife, as a joint owner, made the search neither unreason-
able nor unlawful. Drawing distinctions between cases in which
the wife acted as agent for her husband4" and those in which the
consent was given by her in her capacity as a joint owner,49 the
court found an absence of any interference with the constitutional
rights of the accused.
An issue as to the competency of a witness was developed
in the second case, that of People v. Palivmbo.5 ° In that case, the
defendant's wife was called by the prosecution as a corroborating
witness to an alleged illegal sale of narcotics between the defend-
ant and an informer which occurred in her presence. A defense
objection to the competency of a wife to serve as a witness against
her husband was overruled and the conviction was later affirmed
when the Supreme Court concluded that both the Evidence Act5
and the Criminal Code52 had removed all common-law disquali-
474 I1. (2d) 38, 122 N. E. (2d) 175 (1954). Other aspects of the case, discussed
hereafter, are noted in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIE W 275.
48 Amos v. United States. 255 U. S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654 (1921);
People v. Lind, 370 Ill. 131, 18 N. E. (2d) 189 (1938).
49 Stein v. United States, 166 F. (2d) 851 (1948), cert. den. 344 U. S. 844, 68 S. Ct.
1512, 92 L. Ed. 1768 (94) : State v. Cairo, 74 R. I. 377, 60 A. (2d) 841 (1948).
See also Skally v. United States. 210 F. (2d) 69 (1954), cert. den. 347 U. S. 935,
74 S. Ct. 630, 98 L. Ed. 1086 (1954), dealing with consent by one partner in a
criminal act as serving to bind another partner.
505 Ill. (2d) 409, 125 N. E. (2d) 518 (1955), noted in 33 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW
REmEW 382.
51 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 5.
52 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 734.
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fications between the spouses as witnesses. It should be noted,
however, that the communications as to which the wife testified
were made in the presence of a third person, so as not to be
privileged, hence the case cannot be considered as establishing
the point that a wife would be a competent witness against her
husband for all purposes.
Matters concerning credibility rather than competency were
involved in the third case, entitled People v. Crump 3 in which
murder prosecution the defendant sought to cross-examine an
important prosecution witness54 as to drug addiction, asserting
that answers to the specific questions propounded would have
materially aided in impeaching the credibility of the witness. It
was there, for the first time in this state, held to be reversible
error for the trial judge to sustain an objection to this line of
cross-examination. The Supreme Court, noting that conflicting
conclusions on the point had been reached elsewhere,15 expressed
the belief that resolution on the point as to whether or not the
witness was a drug addict would be a very important factor going
to the general reliability of his testimony.
The fourth case, that of People v. Siciliano,6 recognizes the
degree of surprise or chagrin a prosecuting attorney may ex-
perience when his star witnesses refuse to testify on the ground
of a privilege against self-incrimination but it was the defendant
there who complained that it was prejudicial and reversible error
to permit the prosecuting attorney to develop this fact in the
presence of the jury. The Supreme Court, finding no cases
dealing with the point, reached the sensible conclusion that no
court, in the orderly conduct of a trial, could anticipate whether,
or when, a witness might claim an immunity and that it would
produce interminable delay if the judge, out of the presence of
53 5 Ill. (2d) 251, 125 N. E. (2d) 615 (1955).
54 The witness had been jointly indicted with defendant for the murder, had been
granted a severance, and was, at the time of the trial, in protective custody but
had not been tried or convicted.
55 See annotation in 15 A. L. R. 912.
564 Ill. (2d) 581, 123 N. E. (2d) 725 (1955), cert. den. 349 U. S. 931, 75 S. Ct.
774, 99 L. Ed. (adv.) 647 (1955).
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the jury, had to conduct a preliminary examination of each wit-
ness to ascertain whether or not immunity might be claimed
before allowing the witness to take the stand."
Proper trial tactics to be followed in cases where the defend-
ant is charged, among other things, with being an habitual crimi-
nal were considered in two cases. In People v. Wheeler,58 after
the defendant had testified in his own behalf, the prosecution,
over objection, introduced certified copies of the defendant's
prior convictions primarily for impeachment purposes.59 It was
urged that this was error as the evidence should have taken the
form of authenticated, rather than certified, copies of the earlier
conviction 0 but the court held that, at least as to prior convic-
tions within the state, a certified copy, if complete in form,"1
would serve the purpose. The case of People v. Long,"2 however,
would indicate a degree of dissatisfaction on the part of the
Supreme Court with the currently approved practice of drawing
the attention of the jury to the defendant's prior convictions, the
court noting that the giving of a cautionary instruction, when
realistically considered, could hardly be considered "adequate"
to prevent prejudice. Provision has been made in some states
for a separation of the issues so as to obviate this possibility, but
the court was reluctantly forced to concede that, under the law
as it now exists in Illinois, proof of the current offense and of the
prior conviction must be made during the trial and before the
jury. Reformation of the statute on the point could well be
considered.
5T The case of People v. Bennett, 413 Ill. 601, 110 N. E. (2d) 175 (1953), was
distinguished on the fact that it was there made apparent that the prosecuting
attorney forced the witness to repeatedly assert his immunity so as to suggest, by
implication, that the witness and the defendant hal committed the crime charged.
585 Ill. (2d) 474, 126 N. E. (2d) 228 (1955).
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 734.
60 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 603, does say that "a duly authenticated copy of the
record of the former conviction" shall constitute prima facie proof.
61 See People v. Novak, 343 Ill. 355, 175 N. E. 551 (1931), to the effect that an
incomplete record of the prior offense would be inadmissible.
62 4 I1. (2d) 598, 123 N. E. (2d) 718 (1955), affirming 2 Ill. App. (2d) 529, 120
N. U. (2d) 51 (1964).
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Error appearing in the sentence imposed may be disregarded
if the erroneous language can be considered to be surplusageo
so it was on this basis that the Supreme Court refused, in People
v. Stucker,64 to set aside a conviction on which a sentence de-
scribing a punishment purportedly within statutory limits but
actually beyond the maximum fixed by law had been entered when
it noted that the optional indeterminate minimum-maximum pun-
ishment85 fixed by the trial judge was within the permissible
range. The trial judge may now, under a recent amendment to
the statute, receive evidence after conviction, both as to aggra-
vation and mitigation of the offense and as to the prior record
of the offender, for the purpose of determining the appropriate
punishment to be imposed in cases calling for fixed punishment
rather than an intermediate sentence. 6
Before acting to review convictions in two cases, the review-
ing court concerned found itself forced to settle a question as to
whether or not a defendant who had paid the fine imposed or
served his sentence was entitled to use a writ of error or had, by
submitting to the judgment, rendered the case moot. In People
v. Shambley,"7 the defendant paid the fine and then took prompt
action to procure a reversal of the conviction. In People v.
Williams,8 the defendant, nearly twenty years after he had served
the jail sentence, sought reversal primarily to avoid a heavier
penalty which had attached to a later punishment for another
offense as a second offender. In each instance, the court refused
to dismiss the writ of error and considered the case on the merits
when it concluded the defendant had a right to seek reversal of
an allegedly erroneous conviction despite his submission to the
terms of the sentence. By these holdings, a conflict which pre-
viously had existed among two of the Appellate Courts in the
63 See People ex rel. Weed v. Whipp, 352 Ill. 525, 186 N. E. 135 (1933).
645 111. (2d) 55, 124 N. E. (2d) 893 (1955).
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 802.
66 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 619; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 801.
674 Ill. (2d) 38, 122 N. E. (2d) 172 (1954), noted in 33 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
REvIEW 275.
684 Il. App. (2d) 506, 124 N. E. (2d) 537 (1955).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
state69 has now been resolved. Not so fortunate, however, was
the defendant in the case of People v. Byrnes7 ° for his second
writ of error was dismissed, not so much because his claims had
received consideration under the first writ but because he had,
by his own failure to prosecute that writ effectively, he having
fled the state and suffered the forfeiture of his supersedeas bond,
lost all right to have his claims considered.
Little of consequence has been accomplished in connection
with hearings under the Post-Conviction Act"' but a few cases
could be mentioned. A claim was advanced, in People v. Morris,72
that the defendant bad been denied a constitutional right to a
speedy trial 8 but the contention was rejected when it appeared
that the defendant had not made a motion for discharge on that
ground, hence could be said to have waived the point and thus
eliminated the basis for post-conviction proceedings. He did,
however, succeed in securing a new trial when the court held that
the failure on the part of his court-appointed attorney to raise
the same issue at the initial trial had resulted in depriving him
of due process, including therein the proper representation by
counsel. In People v. Adams,74 by contrast, no relief was ac-
corded, despite the failure of his personally selected counsel to
move on the point, when defendant claimed that he had been
denied the benefit of an impartial jury by being forced, follow-
ing verdict in one case, to stand trial the next day on another
charge before the same panel of jurors, including among them
four who had served and six who had been present at the first
trial. While the court indicated it did not approve the procedure
adopted, it nevertheless affirmed a denial of relief when it noted
that (1) the defendant had not exhausted the number of per-
69 Compare the Fourth District holding in Lambert v. People, 43 il. App. 223
(1892), with the one attained by the Third District in People v. Bandy, 239 Iln.
App. 273 (1925).
704 I1. (2d) 109. 122 N. E. (2d) 247 (1954), cert. den. 349 U. S. 966, 75 S. Ct.
899, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 767 (1955).
71 Iil. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 826 et seq.
72 3 Iln. (2d) 437, 121 N. E. (2d) 810 (1954).
73 Ii1. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 9; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 748.
74 4 Ill. (2d) 453, 123 N. E. (2d) 327 (1954).
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emptory challenges available to him, 7 and (2) his attorney, while
engaging in some discussion with the trial judge over the sub-
ject, had made no specific motion nor evoked any precise ruling
on the crucial point.
Newspaper interference with the orderly conduct of criminal
trials 76 is reflected in the case of People v. Hryciuk.
77  Post-
conviction relief was there granted when it was made to appear
that all of the jurors, the evening before deliberating on the ver-
dict, had read one or both of two inflammatory newspaper ar-
ticles about the defendant. Although the jurors, on interroga-
tion, indicated they would not allow themselves to be influenced
by these articles and were specially cautioned on the point by
the trial judge, a majority of the Supreme Court held that it
was the duty of the trial judge to exercise a degree of discre-
tion in the matter and that he could not avoid arriving at a con-
clusion that a fair trial had or had not been given solely on the
basis of the statements and assurances of the jurors.
V. FAMILY LAW
Problems relating to jurisdiction, with respect to both par-
ties and subject matter, were the chief concern of the courts
during the past year. The necessity of jurisdiction over the
parties was the crucial issue involved in two decisions handed
down by the Appellate Court for the Third District. The first,
Hale v. Hale,' grew out of a situation in which a mother was
awarded custody of her child by the terms of a divorce decree.
Actual custody, however, was in the defendant's sister and, three
years later, she was cited for contempt for refusing to relin-
quish custody. In the contempt proceeding, she was ordered to
surrender the child, but on appeal, the Appellate Court reversed
75 I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 742.
76 On that point in general, see note in 33 CHICAGo-KENT LAW R vIEw 338.
774 I1. (2d) 504, 122 N. E. (2d) 532 (1954), noted in 4 DePaul L. Rev. 323 and
43 Ill. B. J. 512. Daily, J., wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Klingbiel, J.
Denial of rehearing and an additional dissenting opinion by Hershey, J., may be
noted In 125 N. E. (2d) 61 at 69.
15 Ill. App. (2d) 90, 124 N. E. (2d) 596 (1955).
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the lower tribunal on the ground that the original decree could
not have determined the sister's right to custody of the child,
since she had not been made a party to that proceeding. The
second case, that of Horn v. Horn,2 presented a similar but dis-
•tinguishable set of facts. A husband sued his wife for divorce
and the final decree granted custody of the child to the plain-
tiff's father, though subjecting such custody to further order of
the court. A year later, defendant's petition seeking a modifi-
cation of the decree was granted due to a change in her ability
to care for the child. On appeal, it was argued that the court
did not have jurisdiction to alter the custody provision since the
grandfather had not been made a party to the petition for modi-
fication. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision, concluding
that the grandfather's only right was that bestowed upon him by
the court and, since the latter had specifically retained jurisdic-
tion, it could alter a custody decree without the necessity of
having the grandparent before it.
A divorce court's jurisdiction over certain subject matter
was in controversy in two other cases. In Solomon v. Solomon,3
a divorce decree awarded custody of the child to the plaintiff
mother. Upon her remarriage, she instituted proceedings in or-
der to change her child's name to that of her new husband, the
child, then seventeen, having consented thereto. His natural
father, however, filed a petition in the original divorce proceed-
ing for an injunction to restrain the change of name. The in-
junction was granted, and upon appeal, the mother contended
that the divorce court had no jurisdiction to enter such an in-
junction since the Divorce Act 4 did not specifically grant it the
power. The appellate tribunal did not agree, stating that the
right to change the name of a minor is a matter incidental to
the custody of the child and, therefore, is a proper subject for
the divorce court's determination. In the other case, that of
Bremer v. Bremer,5 the circuit court entered a decree of divorce,
2 5 Ill. App. (2d) 346, 125 N. E. (2d) 539 (1955).
3 5 111. App. (2d) 297, 125 N. E. (2d) 675 (1955).
4 I1. Rev. Stat. 15, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 1 et seq.
54 111. (2d) 190. 122 N. E. (2d) 794 (1954).
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specifically retaining, inter alia, jurisdiction to enter an order
for attorney's fees. Sometime thereafter, an order setting at-
torney's fees was entered. It will be recalled that the Divorce
Act' allows the court to reserve the question of attorney's fees
and suit money until the final hearing. It was argued that "final
hearing" means the hearing at which the divorce decree is en-
tered, and consequently, the court is deprived of jurisdiction to
enter such an order thereafter. The lower court overruled this
contention, and upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court, a free-
hold being otherwise involved, that tribunal affirmed. It con-
cluded that this provision was not intended to limit, after a
divorce has been granted, the power of equity to dispose of
matters necessarily incident to a divorce proceeding.
Although dealt with in more detail elsewhereJ it is perti-
nent to this section to note that the Adoption Act8 and the Treat-
ment of Dependent, Neglected and Delinquent Children Act 9 were
under fire in the case of People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Barger.10 The
particular objection was aimed at the provisions which authorize
the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent a mentally
ill parent and consent to the adoption of the latter's child. The
Supreme Court, however, found no defects therein. Also of in-
terest, but probably of minor importance, is the decision in
Hindman v. Holmes," wherein the Appellate Court for the Fourth
District held that the legislative prohibition against interspousal
tort actions 12 was to be given retroactive effect. It, therefore,
ordered the dismissal of a suit pending at the time the statute
was enacted. Although decisions of nisi prius courts are not
typically included in the survey, mention of the case of Doornbos
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 16.
7 See Section VII, Public Law, note 7.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 3--41.
9 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 209.
103 Il. (2d) 511, 121 N. E. (2d) 781 (1954), noted in 33 CHICAGo-KEN'T LAW
REVIEW 249.
114 Il1. App. (2d) 279 124 N. E. (2d) 344 (1955), noted in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvimw 378.
12 Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1, states: "... provided, that neither hus-
band nor wife may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during
coverture .. ".
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
v. Doornbos8 seems appropriate in view of the notoriety it has
received and the social implications incident thereto. Therein,
questions relating to the status of a child conceived through ar-
tificial insemination where the husband was not the donor were
precipitated. The court concluded that the wife was guilty of
adultery and the child must be considered illegitimate. It fol-
lowed, therefore, that the husband had no right or interest in
the child.
Several changes, regulating various aspects of domestic re-
lations, have been produced by amendments or additions to ex-
isting law during the last legislative session. The so-called "cool-
ing-off period" in connection with divorce actions, once held un-
constitutional,14 has been reinstated in a somewhat different
form.'5 Presently, divorce proceedings are to be instituted by
the filing of a praecipe for summons, but the filing of the com-
plaint is delayed for sixty days after the summons is served, thus
providing a waiting period before charges are made public. Like
its predecessor, the present law provides for a waiver of the
waiting period in cases of emergency or necessity. In a com-
panion measure, the act adopted in 1953 authorizing counties or
cities to employ administrative assistants to aid in divorce and
separate maintenance proceedings"8 was repealed and re-adopted
in a somewhat modified form. 7
As the law previously existed, if a wife petitioned for tem-
porary alimony, attorney's fees, or suit money, a showing by the
husband that it was probable that he also had grounds for divorce
would defeat her petition. An amendment" to the Divorce Act
now accords the court discretion in such a situation to deter-
1' Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, Case No. 54-S-14981, noted in 43 Geo.
L. J. 517, and 30 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1016. It is understood that no appeal has been
taken.
14 People v. Connell, 2 Ill. (2d) 332, 118 N. E. (2d) 262 (1954), noted in 42 Iil.
B. J. 714, and 1954 Ill. L. Forum 322.
15 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 786; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 7 et seq.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 7a et seq.
17 Laws 1955, p. U-, . B. No. 785; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 30 et seq.
18 Laws 1955, p. H-, . B. No. 421; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 16.
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mine whether these allowances should be granted, denied, or re-
served until final hearing. It also places the spouses on a par
since it applies to both and not merely to the wife as was the
case with the prior provision. The uniform law relating to the
support of dependents has undergone a revision19 which substan-
tially enlarges the duty to support dependents or relatives likely
to become a public charge. And last, but not least, the Adoption
Act has been revised so that venue provisions are now specifically
set out.20  In connection with such proceedings, the legislature
has now provided for the effect to be given defects in the plead-
ings, and the lack of jurisdiction over one or more of the parties
involved.21
VI. PROPERTY
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
Concerning the acquisition of rights in real estate by way
of title to land, a vacuum in the area of case law was filled by
the General Assembly when it abolished the doctrine of worthier
title in this state.1 Without attempting to discuss the unhappy
history of the worthier title doctrine, suffice it to say that since
the decision in Corwin v. Rheirns,2 there has been a general dis-
satisfaction with the law on this point and the need for change
was obvious. However, the act is not retroactive, so the doctrine
must still be considered in the construction of deeds and wills
operative prior to its effective date.
Similarly, with respect to rights in the land of another, there
are no significant cases. However, it should be noted that the
19 Laws 1955, p.-, H. B. No. 372; Ili. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 50 et seq.
20 Laws 1955, p.-, H. B. No. 14; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 1-1.
21 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 554; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, §§ 7-4-5.
1 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 69; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 188-9. The
doctrine is frequently stated to be that if a man devises his land by will to his heir
at law and his heirs, in such case the devise, as such, is void, and the heir will take
by descent and not by purchase, for the reason that the title by descent is the
worthier and better title: Ellis v. Page, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 161 (1851) ; Doctor v.
Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919) ; Carey and Schuyler, Illinois Law of
Future Interests (Burdette Smith Co., Chicago, 1941), § 123 et seq.
2 390 Ill. 205, 61 N. E. (2d) 40 (1945).
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legislature, during its most recent session, repealed prior drain-
age laws,3 and enacted an entirely new and comprehensive
drainage code.
4
Aspects of conveyancing law and the rights of parties con-
cerned in a sale of real property came before the courts in a few
cases. In that connection, the case of Whitelaw v. Brady' may
serve as a starting point for the issues there revolved around
the sufficiency of a memorandum signed by the vendor, desig-
nated as an "option" but more nearly in the nature of a contin-
uing offer, to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.'
Unfortunately for the vendee, the memorandum left a couple of
essential points in an alternative or indefinite form7 so the court
held the memorandum to be insufficient, even though the parties
later came to an oral accord with respect to these points. Of
necessity, therefore, the basic writing to support an enforcible
sale of real property must be sufficiently complete that the court,
in a suit for specific performance, will not need to go beyond the
terms thereof in order to spell out the bargain to be enforced.
The wisdom of requiring the signature of the spouse of
the seller to the contract of sale, so as to make the same com-
pletely enforcible, was again evidenced by the case of Ennis v.
Johnson,8 except that there the wife's signature was particularly
required because she was a joint tenant and, as such, held title
to the land in question with her husband. The husband's promise,
in which the wife had not joined, was there enforced with a suit-
able abatement in the price9 when the court followed customary
R Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1. Ch. 42. § 1 to 76c, nnd 82 to 246b.2.
4 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 76: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 42, § 1-1 et seq.
53 111. (2d) 583, 121 N. E. (2d) 785 (1954).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 2.
7 The amount of the down payment was stated as "$2,500 or $3,000." The date
for the commencement of monthly payments on the unpaid balance of the price was
left blank.
83 111. (2d) 383, 121 N. E. (2d) 480 (1954).
9 For this purpose, the court found the wife entitled to a one-half interest in the
land and observed that the process of closing the contract involved no more than
"a matter of simple arithmetic." It might be note(, however, that the property was
encumbered by an existing mortgage for more than 50% of the sale price, which
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doctrines 0 despite the argument that a different rule should be
applied where a joint tenancy was concerned. 1
In order that a suit for damages for breach of contract to
sell real property might lie it would be essential for the plaintiff,
prior to suit, to tender performance on his part since, without
this, the other party is under no obligation to act hence cannot
be said to have breached any duty. Such a tender before suit
would also probably be desirable if the plaintiff plans to seek
relief in equity by way of specific performance. The case of
Moehling v. Pierce,'2 however, would indicate that, in the latter
instance, the tender may come as late as the hearing of the case,
consonant with the fundamental equitable principle that the right
to relief is to be conditioned according to the circumstances as
they exist at the time the decree is to be entered. The case is
also somewhat unusual in that the arrangement enforced was
one by which a seller of land had reserved to himself an option
to repurchase a portion of the land sold to use for roadway pur-
poses. This option had been transferred to certain remote grantees
who had acquired adjoining property formerly owned by the
original grantor. Specific performance of the option was di-
rected at the instance of these remote grantees, possibly on the
theory the option was, to some degree, appurtenant to the prem-
ises which they had acquired but the court did not go into any
discussion on this point.
Matters relating to priority of right were concerned in two
cases. In the first of them, that of Neuberg v. Clute,8 a lawyer
had contracted to purchase an improved parcel of real estate and,
mortgage the vendee had contracted to assume. Query, therefore, whether he was
to pay one-half of the price and assume one-half of the outstanding mortgage or
take over the entire mortgage and give the husband virtually nothing for his equity
in the property.
10 See ,Moore v. Garigletti, 228 I1. 143, 81 N. E. 826 (1907), for an abatement case
where the vendor held no more than a two-fifths interest in the property.
11 The court distinguished the case before it from the one concerned in Spadoni v.
Frigo. 307 Il1. 32, 138 N. E. 226 (1923), also a joint tenancy case. on the ground
that, in that case, the entire contract was conditioned upon the Wife's consent and
she had never consented to sell.
123 Il1. (2d) 418, 121 N. E. (2d) 735 (1964).
136111. (2d) 58, 126 N. E. (2d) 648 (1955).
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realizing that the vendor would be unable to convey full title
until certain outstanding interests had been acquired, had agreed
to defer the closing of the deal until a long time after the making
of the contract. This contract was not recorded. In the passage
of time, a tenant came to reside in the building and, on learning
that the property was to be sold at partition sale under a pro-
ceeding begun by the original seller to clear title, the tenant
caused the property to be bid in by a third person who became
the buyer at such sale. The tenant-purchaser had no actual
knowledge of the outstanding prior contract.1" When the lawyer-
buyer learned of these events, he sued to compel specific per-
formance of his agreement but recovery was denied when it was
held that the tenant, by taking possession and acquiring a contract
purchaser's interest in the property, even though this contract
had likewise not been recorded, had given notice of his later
rights and had thereby acquired a superior equitable interest in
the premises over the lawyer-purchaser who had failed to record.
Even more complicated, because the title to the vacant land
there concerned had been registered under the Torrens System,
was the priority problem involved in the case of Prassas v. Jana."
An owner of registered land had there encumbered the same with
a trust deed for security purposes and had later conveyed the
property subject to this lien, the grantee receiving an owner's
duplicate certificate of title. Almost twenty years later and long
after the debt had gone into default, the holder of the note and
trust deed instituted a strict foreclosure proceeding and, in time,
obtained a decree in his favor based on service by publication.
He then conveyed the premises to another who, in turn, conveyed
to a third, each claiming to be a bona fide purchaser by reason
of relying on the basis of the original Torrens certificate. These
deeds and the foreclosure decree were duly registered but the
14 An attempt to impute notice to the tenant because he had utilized the services
of an attorney who had represented the original seller and who had drafted the
contract of purchase was rejected on the basis that the ordinary rule, by which
notice to the agent is imputed to the principal. is not to be applied where the
attorney-agent would be obliged to divulge a professional confidence if he were to
impart his knowledge of one client's affairs when acting as agent for another.
154 Ill. App. (2d) 385, 124 N. E. (2d) 643 (1955).
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owner's duplicate certificate of title was not surrendered nor
was it, by the decree, ordered cancelled. Within one year of the
strict foreclosure,"6 the holders of certain unregistered deeds to
the property, claiming title from and under the original mort-
gagor, instituted proceedings to vacate the decree of foreclosure. 7
Their petition was denied by the trial court but, on review, this
order was reversed on the ground the failure on the part of the
petitioners to register their deeds, and thus give notice of their
rights, did not prevent them from seeking relief as the trans-
ferees of the mortgagee could not be said to be purchasers with-
out notice of the possibility of outstanding claims. About the
only basis for any notice that could exist was the uncancelled
notation on the Torrens register that an owner's duplicate cer-
tificate had been issued and that it had not been surrendered nor
judicially declared cancelled, 8 but this was said to be sufficient
for the purpose. It would appear, therefore, that no one can
claim to be a purchaser without notice of registered lands if he
ignores suspicious entries on the original Torrens certificate or
takes title while an outstanding duplicate certificate remains un-
surrendered and uncancelled.
One remaining point of concern might be mentioned. Here-
tofore, a plat of subdivision was required only in the event the
owner contemplated dividing his land for the purpose of laying
out a town or making an addition to an existing municipality. 9
By legislative action, a statutory plat of subdivision is now re-
quired whenever land is divided into parts and any divided por-
tion thereof is less than five acres in extent, regardless of the
16111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 50(8), allows a defendant served by
publication one year within which to act to vacate the decree.
17 The application was based on the premise the lien had expired by limitation,
there was no proof of insolvency on the part of the debtor, the property was not
shown to be scant security for the debt, and the mortgagor no longer held title to
the premises. For the conditions under which strict foreclosure will be permitted,
see Farrell v. Parker, 50 Ill. 274 (1869).
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 91, directs the Torrens Registrar to stamp
the surrendered duplicate certificate "cancelled." Ibid., § 125, declares that no
transfer based on a judicial sale shall be registered unless the duplicate owner's
certificate is surrendered or an order of court is filed directing the transfer and the
cancellation of the outstanding certificate.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 109, § 1.
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purpose of subdivision. Enforcement of this requirement is left
in the hands of the Recorder of Deeds who is commanded not to
record any deed or lease designed to convey an interest in prop-
erty in violation of the amended provision.2
Two interesting personal property cases were decided within
the survey period and are worthy of mention. In the case of
In re Schneider's Esta-te,21 the decedent took one Ralston to the
bank and opened two joint savings accounts in his and Ralston's
names. The transaction involved the execution of a typical joint
savings account contract which, inter alia, permitted withdrawals
by either party and provided for rights of survivorship. On trial,
the court, over objection, admitted parol evidence which tended
to prove that Ralston had provided none of the funds and that
the joint savings accounts were opened for the purpose of placing
Ralston in a position to obtain Schneider's money for him in
the event of illness, and not with the intent of making an inter
vivos gift to Ralston. Ralston based his claim to the accounts
on the theory that the instrument was a contract between him-
self and Schneider and parol evidence was inadmissible to vary
its terms. The Supreme Court held, however, that the form of
the instrument was not conclusive and that parol evidence was
admissible to show what the decedent intended.
The theory of a gift inter vivos was the only contention upon
which the petitioner could prevail in the case of In re Whaley's
Estate,22 because there the petitioner was claiming the proceeds
of a savings account that was in the decedent's name alone. The
key to the petitioner's case was his possession of the bank book
together with some evidence that the decedent intended her to
have the proceeds of the account. However, the key didn't open
any doors for lack of sufficient evidence of an intended gift.
20 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 783; Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 109, § 1 and § 5a.
216 II1. (2d) 180. 127 N. E. (2d) 445 (1955). affirming 2 Il1. App. (2d) 560, 120
N. E. (2d) 353 (1954), noted in M3 CHIoAGO-KET LAw REViEw 189. Hershey, J.
filed a dissenting opinion in which Klingbiel, J. concurred.
223 III. App. (2d) 333, 122 N. E. (2d) 46 (1954).
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LANDLORD AND TENANT
Although there are no startling developments in this area,
it would be a fair inference to state that the liability of a landlord
for injuries sustained on leased premises is expanding, as is ex-
emplified in the recent cases of Alaimo v. DuPont2" and Durkin
v. Lewitz.' In the Alaimo case, an employee of the tenant was
fatally injured by a defective elevator which the landlord had
covenanted to keep in repair. Although the court conceded the
majority rule to be that a covenant to repair does not carry with
it liability for injuries sustained,25 it construed the covenant as
one requiring the landlord to keep the elevator in a safe condi-
tion, the breach of which would carry liability for injuries. Thus,
it was ruled that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for
the landlord.
In the Durkin case, liability was again imposed on the land-
lord, on this occasion for injuries sustained by the household
employee of a tenant resulting from a fall on a stair landing
which formed a part of a common passageway. A defective drain
gutter permitted water to run on the landing which froze and
created a hazardous condition. One of two conflicting rules could
govern the landlord's responsibility in this area. The Massa-
chusetts rule is that the landlord is under no obligation to keep
leased premises safe, the only obligation being to maintain the
premises as they were when let.26 The Connecticut rule requires
the landlord to keep the leased premises in a reasonably safe
condition and this includes the removal of ice and snow from
common passageways when required. In spite of at least one
prior decision in this state adopting the Massachusetts rule,2
the Appellate Court for the First District distinguished between
23 4 Ill. App. (2d) 85. 123 N. E. (2d) 583 (1955).
24 3 I1. App. (2d) 481, 123 N. E. (2d) 151 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
25 4 Ill. App. (2d) 85 at 89, 123 N. E. (2d) 583 at 585.
26 Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 457 (1883), is the leading
case.
27 Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 128 A. 705 (1925).
28 Cronin v. Brownhle, 348 I1. App. 448, 109 N. E. (2d) 352 (1952).
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the general application of that rule and the facts of this case
and ruled that Illinois requires the landlord to keep common
passageways reasonably safe. Thus, it is clear that the landlord
has a positive duty to remove accumulations of ice and snow
from common passageways to the extent that the safety of the
premises is affected.
The failure of a lessee to hold a race meet at the lessor's
track was the cause of a lawsuit entitled Fox v. Fox Valley Trot-
ting Club.2" The lease gave the lessee the sole right to hold horse
race meets and other sporting activities at the lessor's track. The
rent was a base sum plus a percentage of the total amount wag-
ered each year. During one year of the lease, the lessee failed
to hold a meet at the lessor's track but did hold a meet at an-
other track. The lessor brought an action for an accounting for
rent due and pressed the argument that the agreement between
the parties obligated the lessee to use and occupy the track
for its intended purpose. The reviewing court was unable to
discover any language in the lease requiring the lessee to operate
at the lessor's track, nor could the court find an implied obliga-
tion as would be the case if the rent was based solely on operat-
ing revenues without a base rent.
Lastly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ap-
pellate Court for the First District in the case of Pierce v. Pierce.30
It is thus settled in this state that the Partition Act of 194931
permits the partition of long term leasehold estates.
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Cases falling in the realm of mortgage law and related topics
are not rare but few of them can be said to possess novelty.
Nevertheless, a few points have been made which call for notice.
In the case of Atkins v. Wallace"" the old problem as to whether
29 4 Ill. App. (2d) 94, 123 N. E. (2d) 595 (1954). After the period covered by the
survey, the Supreme Court reversed in - Ill. (2d) -, 129 N. E. (2d) 739 (1955).
304 Ill. (2d) 497, 123 N. E. (2d) 511 (1954), affirming 351 Ill. App. 336, 115 N. E.
(2d) 107 (1953), noted in 32 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 265.
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 44 et seq.
32 6 Il1. App. (2d) 362, 127 N. E. (2d) 500 (1955).
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or not an absolute conveyance could be treated as a masked se-
curity transaction developed with a new twist. The land owners
there concerned, apparently unable to keep up with mortgage pay-
ments, interested a third person to advance funds to cure the
default and gave him a quit-claim deed to the premises in return
for a sealed written agreement under which he undertook to make
future payments.13  The agreement recited that the deed had
been given "as security" and the grantee promised to reconvey
"when and if payment advances are repaid in full" but the
grantors in no way obligated themselves to reimburse the third
person. In suit to have the quit-claim deed declared to be a
mortgage and to permit redemption of the premises, the court
held, in conformity with some earlier cases, 34 that the right to
redeem had to be reciprocal to a right to foreclose so that if the
alleged mortgagee was unable to enforce payment of the advances
made85 the alleged mortgagor had, at best, a mere option to re-
purchase. On the basis of this reasoning, the quit-claim deed
was declared to be an absolute one. Despite this, the court recog-
nized the validity of the agreement as adequate to constitute an
enforcible option for a reconveyance so it can be assumed that
the once desperate grantors were able to regain their property.
From their standpoint, then, the precise reasoning followed to
support the result could well be considered as being immaterial.
In the event a real estate mortgage or trust deed'is used,
it is fundamental law that the mortgagor can grant no greater
estate for security purposes than he then has, save as he may
later acquire additional rights in the premises which may then
be said to inure to the mortgagee 's benefit. There is indication,
in the case of South Side Bank & Trust Company v. Sherlock
33 No figures of consequence were provided in the opinion, but inadequacy of price
is a factor to be considered in determining whether a mortgage or a sale was
intended.
34 Caraway v. Sly, 222 Ill. 203, 78 N. E. 588 (1906) ; Robison v. Moorefield, 347
Ill. App. 508, 107 N. E. (2d) 278 (1952).
35 No consideration appears to have been given thus far to the possibility of an
implied in law promise to compel repayment. Such a promise, resting on equitable
grounds, should not be difficult to establish, particularly if the advances are made
at the debtor's request.
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Holmes, Inc.,a8 that the mortgagee's position may be improved
beyond that which existed at the time the mortgage was given
by subsequent events other than the acquisition of some additional
title. Under the facts of that case, a loan had been made and
a mortgage taken on adjoining portions of two vacant lots. The
mortgagor was the full owner of one portion but held no more
than a one-half interest as tenant in common with another as to
the other portion and the co-tenant had not joined in the mort-
gage. The mortgagor later improved the land in such a way
that a portion of the structure stood on the land held by the
co-tenants. In partition proceedings thereafter instituted, the
non-joining co-tenant became owner in full of this portion of the
entire tract. Following default under the mortgage, a foreclosure
suit was instituted to which the former co-tenant was made a
party and, when a decree was entered directing the sale of the
mortgagor's interest and giving the mortgagee a first lien on
the improvements, the former co-tenant appealed. The decree
was affirmed when the court, using principles applied in partition
and similar cases,"7 reached the result that, when one co-tenant
makes improvements at his own expense and the land cannot be
so divided as to allot the improved portion to him, such person
is entitled to a lien upon the proceeds of sale for the enhancement
in value caused by his improvement. This lien was, therefore,
declared to be available to the mortgagee as so much additional
security for his debt. 8
While the mortgagee's security interest can become greater
by subsequent events, the case of Kling v. Ghilarducci39 demon-
strates that it cannot be diminished by later acts on the part of
the mortgagor. According to the facts of that case, a parcel of
366 111. App. (2d) 138, 126 N. E. (2d) 742 (1955).
37 Oppenheimer v. Szulerecki, 297 Ill. 81, 130 N. E. 325, 28 A. L. R. 1439 (1921):
Noble v. Tipton, 219 Ill. 182, 76 N. E. 151. 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 645 (190.5).
.38 Apparently, in the event the mortgagee became purchaser under the foreclosure
sale, he would acquire full title to one part of the premises, an undivided one-half
interest in the other part, and a lien on the proceeds of sale arising from some
future partition proceeding as to the part so held in common for the enhanced
value thereof, the nature and extent of which would still have to be determined.
39 3 Il. (2d) 454. 121 N. E. (2d) 752 (1954).
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land had, at one time, been improved with two separate build-
ings. One of the structures, with its part of the land, was sub-
jected to an encumberance by way of mortgage under which
the defendants eventually claimed title through foreclosure and
sale. The other structure, in the rear of the lot, was later oc-
cupied by the plaintiff who had earlier taken title to the entire
property but who had lost the front portion through the afore-
mentioned foreclosure, to which suit plaintiff had been made a
party. Prior to foreclosure sale but after the mortgage had
been given and suit thereon had been instituted, the plaintiff had
tapped into a water service pipe in the front building to supply
her needs with respect to the rear building. When defendant
shut off this supply, she sued to establish an easement in her
favor."' It was there decided that, if plaintiff ever had any right
to assert an easement for this purpose, it had been lost by reason
of her failure to assert the same in the foreclosure suit. Even
if this had not been the case, the title acquired by the defendants
through foreclosure was said to relate back to the date when the
mortgage had been given, had operated to cut off any intervening
equities, and could not be affected by any subsequent acts intended
to create easements in the land to the prejudice of the rights of
the mortgagee.
One small point concerning foreclosure law41 was made
through the medium of the case of Skach v. Sykor. 4 2  After
foreclosure and sale, at which the premises were sold for an
amount in excess of the debt due but for considerably less than
the stipulated value, the mortgagors were able to raise funds
with which to redeem. Well within the one-year period permitted
for this purpose,43 the mortgagors addressed an inquiry to the
40 Other easements. such as one to maintain an external stairway which over-
lapped the boundary line between the parts of the lot, and of ingress and egress
over a sidewalk, were also asserted.
41 See above, this division at note 15. for a discussion of the case of Prassas v.
Jana, 4 Ill. App. (2d) 385. 124 N. E. (2d) (43 (1955). which grew out of an attempt
at strict foreclosure, a process seldom used. The case, however, turned on other
issues.
426 Il1. (2d) 215, 127 N. E. (2d) 453 (1955).
43 TI1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 18.
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master in chancery concerned with the case as to the amount
needed for purpose of redemption and deposited the amount
fixed by him and were given a certificate of redemption. By
error, the master had calculated interest on the sale price at the
rate of five per cent. whereas the rate should have been six per
cent., hence the deposited amount proved to be inadequate. The
error was not discovered until after the one-year period had
run but, on learning of the fact, the mortgagors promptly tend-
ered the deficit. In a suit by the purchaser at foreclosure sale
to compel the issuance of a deed in his favor, the Supreme
Court, borrowing from views expressed in tax redemption and
similar cases," declared it would be inequitable to deny relief
against an error on the part of the landowners who had made
an honest attempt to redeem but who had been frustrated by the
mistake of another, particularly where there was a gross inade-
quacy in the sale price. While admitting that the statutory right
to redeem was one which could not, normally, be exercised except
within the time period and in the manner fixed by law, 5 the
court announced that it would be the policy hereafter, unless in-
jury would result to the purchaser at the sale, to give a liberal
construction to the statute at hand.
Insofar as security interest in personal property may have
been involved in the cases, little of moment has occurred. The
case of Dasher v. Bruno," however, might prove to be interesting
for the court there, unable to classify the creditor's interest as
falling within any one of the more conventional patterns, achieved
the result that an equitable lien had arisen under the facts before
it. The debtor-buyer there concerned had undertaken to purchase
a block of corporate stock pursuant to an arrangement by which
44 See Converse v. Rankin, 115 Ill. 398, 4 N. E. 504 (1886), as to redemption from
tax sales, and Block v. Hooper, 318 Inl. 182, 149 N. E. 21 (1925), as to redemption
from sales based on writs of execution.
45 By contrast, in Muir v. Mierwin, 385 Ill. 273, 52 N. E. (2d) 801 (1944). re-
demption was denied to certain co-tenants, who sought to protect their interests in
the premises by tendering only their fractional portions of the sale price, because
the amount tendered had been inaccurately calculated by virtue of the same error
over the rate of interest as the one made in the instant case.
46 5 Il. App. (2d) 500, 126 N. E. (2d) 404 (1955).
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1954-1955
the shares were transferred to the buyer, who was to enjoy all the
privileges of ownership until default occurred, and the same
shares were immediately endorsed in blank and placed in escrow
to secure the amount due on the purchase price which was pay-
able in monthly installments.4 7 After several payments had been
made, the buyer defaulted but insisted that the seller was limited
by the contract" to the return of only part of the stock so de-
posited in escrow, supposed to be the seller's exclusive remedy.
Upon finding that the contract term provided no more than one
of several elective methods under which the seller could with-
draw, the court proceeded to consider whether a foreclosure of
some form of seller's lien would be appropriate. As the trans-
action involved neither a pledge, a conditional sale, or a chattel
mortgage, because lacking in essential elements of each, but did
serve to subject specific personal property to the payment of a
debt, the court achieved the conclusion that an equitable lien
had been intended, a lien which could properly be enforced by
the sale of the entire block of stock.4"
Independently of judicial remedies for the enforcement of
claims to security in personal property, the legislature acted to
make some changes in the statutory law relating to chattel mort-
gages. Under the first of them, the time for filing a chattel
mortgage so as to validate the lien thereof has been enlarged
from fifteen to twenty dates from the date of execution and, to
accommodate the practice of taking a combination real estate
and chattel mortgage as security, the lien so created may, by the
filing of appropriate affidavits of extension from time to time,
be made to run as long as twenty years in lieu of the five-year
47 The buyer was not to be entitled to the return of any of his stock so deposited
until he had made full payment of the price.
48 The contract did state that, in the event of default, the seller "shall be entitled
to receive one share of said stock for each One Hundred Dollars ($100) of unpaid
principal and interest."
49 The contract lacked an acceleration clause but all unpaid installments had
matured by the time the appeal had been determined so the court, following a
common equitable practice to fashion the decree according to the circumstances as
they existed on the date of the decree, experienced no difficulty in arriving at the
conclusion that the whole block of stock should be sold for the purpose of realizing
funds to pay the entire balance due on the purchase price.
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limitation heretofore in effect as to chattel mortgage security.50
By the second amendment, the requirement that a note secured
by a chattel mortgage shall so state on its face, under penalty
of being declared absolutely void if it does not bear such a legend,
has been made inoperative as to notes given by corporate debt-
ors.1 The business of factoring, i.e. the loaning of money on
goods in process, on finished goods intended for sale, and on ac-
counts receivable, has now been made the subject of statutory
regulation with provision for the filing of a general notice of in-
tention to engage in this method of financing as a basis for
providing protection as to priority of right.5 2  The statute does
not apply to bailments, pledges, consignments of merchandise, or
field-warehousing operations wherein possession, actual or con-
structive, may still serve to give a degree of notice to third persons.
Proceedings to enforce mechanic's liens 53 afforded an op-
portunity for the resolution of two debatable points. It had previ-
ously been announuced that no lien of this character could arise
where the work done by the mechanic had resulted in a violation of
law for, in such a case, the court would be asked to base its sanc-
tions upon an illegal undertaking.5 4 An important distinction to
this principal has now been drawn by the case of Meissner v.
Caravello5 The work performed there, upon which the lien was
sought, had been done by a sub-contractor in the mistaken belief
that an essential municipal permit for certain remodelling bad
been obtained when none had, in fact, been issued. Not until the
bearing of the case, long after completion and acceptance of the
work, did the owner base an objection to a lien because of the lack
50 Laws 1955, p. H-, . B. No. 47; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 4.
51 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 229: 111. Rev. Stat. 1955. Vol. 2, Ch. 9,5. § 26. Such
uotes would also now appear to be free from defenses which might be asserted
against the payee in the event of a transfer to a third person.
52 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 579: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955. Vol. 2. Ch. 82. § 102 et seq.
The statutory form of notice is comparable to the one used in trust receipt trans-
actions pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955. Vol. 2, Ch. 121Y2. § 178, but is to be filed in
the office of the recorder of deeds for the county where the factored merchandise is
located, kept or stored, rather than in the office of the Secretary of State.
53 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 1 et seq.
54 Bairstow v. Northwestern University, 287 Ill. App. 424, 5 N. E. (2d) 269 (1936).
55 4 Ill. App. (2d) 428, 124 N. D. (2d) 615 (1955). Appeal therein has been dis-
missed.
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of the permit, whereupon the lien claimant procured the late
issuance of this permit, an act which could apparently have been
done initially as there was nothing to indicate that the job would
lead to any violation of the local building ordinance. Although
the ordinance provided for penalties in case work was done
without a permit, the court refused to declare the basic contract
illegal, so it permitted the lien to stand when it found the public
welfare had been in no way endangered by the oversight. To
accomplish this result, the court differentiated between those
cases where no permit had been secured because, under law, no
such permit would or could be granted and those wherein a
permit might have been obtained but, inadvertently, had not
been secured. The point to this distinction should be an obvi-
ous one.
Procedural rather than substantive issues were generated
in the other mechanic's lien case, that of Wise v. Jerone.5 6  The
trial court there, upon finding a total absence for the assertion
of a statutory lien as the parties had not dealt with one another
as owner and materialman,57 denied a lien but did grant a per-
sonal judgment in favor of the claimant for an amount found to
be due. This judgment was reversed on appeal when it was
said that there was nothing in the Mechanic's Lien Act5s which
conferred jurisdiction on the court to enter such a judgment
and that nothing in the Civil Practice Act had operated to change
the law on the point.59 While recognizing that certain of the
Appellate Courts had approved the rendition of law judgments
in actions which began as proceedings in equity but in which
no basis for equitable relief bad been found to exist,60 the court
56 5 Ill. App. (2d) 214, 125 N. E. (2d) 292 (1955).
57 They had, apparently, been joint adventurers in the erection and operation of
a motel and a restaurant.
58 Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 1 et seq.
59 The former practice is illustrated by Green v. Sprague, 120 Ill. 146, 11 N. E. 859
(1887), and McCarthy v. Neu, 93 Ill. 455 (1879). A statutory attempt to confer
such jurisdiction was declared unconstitutional in Turnes v. Brenckle, 249 Ill. 394,
94 N. E. 495 (1911), as tending to deprive the defendant of the right to trial by
jury.
60 See particularly the case of Westerfield v. Redmer. 310 Ill. App. 246, 33 N. E.
(2d) 744 (1941), criticized in 20 CmCAGo-KENT LAW REvmw 59-60. Equity courts
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refused to apply this principle to matters resting purely on a
statutory foundation, particularly when the statute was one to
be given strict construction. 1
Some slight changes have been made by the legislature in
certain of the lien statutes. Hereafter, the statutory mechanic's
lien notice which serves as the basis for a claim against real estate
because of improvements made thereon is to be filed in the office
of the recorder of deeds for the appropriate county instead of in
the office of the clerk of the circuit court 62 and, consonant with
that change, suitable textual revisions have been made in other
portions of the statute. 3 The several recorders of deeds are
now entitled to demand increased fees for the registration of
notices regarding internal revenue tax liens 4 and the same thing
is true with respect to claim notices concerning liens for work
done on oil and gas wells and pipe lines. 6
TRUSTS
The problem as to when inter vivos trusts constitute at-
tempted testamentary dispositions has plagued the courts for
many years. The liberal tendency manifested by some of the
courts in the last decades towards recognizing and upholding
such trusts as valid inter vivos transactions was forcefully dem-
onstrated by the remarkable decision of the Supreme Court in
Farkas v. Williams."8 The settlor purchased several stock cer-
tificates and ordered the corporation whose stock he bought to
have, of course, long exercised jurisdiction to grant incidental relief, even of legal
character, provided some fundamental basis for the granting of equitable relief
can be found present in the case.
61 Support for this holding may be found in the case of Edwin Pratt's Sons' Co.
v. Schafer, 290 Ill. App. 80, 7 N. E. (2d) 901 (1937), where a mechanic's lien was
permitted to attach to a fund arising from a public improvement as a claim in rem
but a personal deficiency decree for a balance due in excess of the fund was held
to be extrajudicial.
62 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 874; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 7.
63 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, §§ 25, 35, 38, 42, and 44.
64 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 872; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 69.
65 Laws 195.5, p. -, S. B. No. 606; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 80.
665 Ill. (2d) 417, 125 N. E. (2d) 600 (1955), reversing 3 111. App. (2d) 248,
121 N. U. (2d) 344 (1954), noted in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 192.
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issue the stock in his name as trustee for a named beneficiary.
At the same time he executed a declaration of trust in which he
stated that he was holding the stock certificates in trust for the
beneficiary. Therein, he reserved to himself far-reaching powers
with respect to the stock, such as the right to receive and to use
the dividends during his lifetime and to vote, sell and deal with
the stock. He further provided that upon a sale of the stock the
trust should terminate and that the same result should follow
if the beneficiary should predecease him. Last but not least, he
reserved to himself the right to change the beneficiary and to
revoke or modify the trust at any time he chose to do so. Despite
that vast array of powers which the settlor retained in the
trust property, the court felt that no testamentary disposition was
attempted, inasmuch as the settlor made it clear that he acquired
and held the property as a trustee. The fact that he could change
the beneficiary and terminate the trust by selling the trust prop-
erty were only incidents and powers encompassed by the greater
right to revoke the trust at any time. The right to revoke a
trust has never been considered to be a reservation of such con-
trol over the trust property as would constitute a testamentary
disposition.
The right of contingent beneficiaries to protect their interest
in a trust was reaffirmed in the case of Burrows v. Palmer.
67
Therein, contingent beneficiaries were permitted to file a suit
against a trustee who was charged with appropriating trust prop-
erty to his own use.
With respect to contingent interests, reference should be
made to the interesting problem arising in Shamel v. Shamel,6
which involved some very tenuous interests of possible benefi-
ciaries. The trust agreement left the identity of remaindermen
subject to a power of appointment, with appropriate alternative
provisions in the event the power was not exercised. The real
estate which constituted the trust corpus contained deposits of
67 5 Ill. (2d) 434, 125 N. E. (2d) 484 (1955).
68 3 1. (2d) 425, 121 N. E. (2d) 819 (1954).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
coal. Circumstances arose which made it desirable to sell the
mining rights since, if not then sold, the possibility of removing
the coal would, as a matter of economics, be lost forever. On
appeal from a proceeding brought under Section 50 of the Chan-
cery Act, 9 the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the lower
court which appointed a trustee of the mineral and mining rights
and authorized the sale thereof. The court took the position
that this statutory provision was intended to apply to every
possible future interest, whether legal or equitable, and did not
attempt to classify the future interests here involved, though it
did point out that a potential appointee had none and any which
did exist were in those persons who would take under the alterna-
tive provisions. Moreover, it is well recognized under the common
law that a court may order a deviation from the trust instrument
when the interests of the beneficiaries require it.
Of the greatest importance was the enactment of the so-
called testamentary pour-over provisions. Under a new section
70
added to the Probate Act,7' it is now possible for a testator to
provide in his will for additions to an existing trust, although
the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation or
termination. Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so
added to the trust will be governed by the trust instrument, re-
gardless of any amendments or modifications of the trust made
before or after the making of the will and before the testator's
death.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
Both the General Assembly and the courts have been busy
with the law of wills and probate administration during the
survey period. For purposes of presentation, the significant
decisions of the reviewing courts are discussed first.
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 50, which, in essence, authorizes the action
taken herein with respect to contingent future interests arising in certain enu-
merated ways, "or otherwise".
70 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 100; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 194a.
71 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 151 et seq.
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The interesting case of In re Ostrowski's Estate7 2 raised
the question of whether the following instrument, set forth ver-
batim, should be admitted to probate: "All my Property belong
to Borton Stollar all together with Lot land. Lena Ostrowski."73
The signatures of two attesting witnesses were also on the
instrument. The circuit court reversed the probate court and
denied admission of the instrument to probate on the ground
that it made no disposition of property. On appeal, the circuit
court decision was reversed for two reasons. First, the lower
courts having jurisdiction over the admission of wills are required
to admit wills to probate that comply with the requirements of
Sections 43 and 69 of the Probate Act"4 and, in the absence of
fraud, undue influence, or the like, may not inquire into testa-
mentariness for the purpose of determining admission. Second,
the testatrix did, in fact, succeed in disposing of her property
through the above instrument since the word "belong", as it
appeared in context, was sufficient to show an intent to dispose
of property.
Two cases involved problems of construction. In Stites v.
Gray,7 5 the testator left his personal property and a life estate
in his realty to his wife. The remainder interest in the realty
he gave to such persons who, at his death, would be his heirs by
the Illinois law of descent. Technically, of course, this would
include the surviving spouse and that was her theory in claiming
a share of the remainder interest in the realty. Though armed
with at least two rules of construction suggesting a result in her
favor, 76 she lost the case. The Supreme Court held that the
723 Ill. App. (2d) 431, 122 N. E. (2d) 56 (1954), noted in 43 Ill. B. J. 677.
733 I1. App. (2d) 431 at 432, 122 N. E. (2d) 596 at 596.
74 11. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 194 and 221.
754 Ill. (2d) 510, 123 N. E. (2d) 483 (1954), noted in 1955 Ill. L. Forum 186.
76 (1) When a gift of a life estate is made to a named person and a gift of a
remainder in the same property Is made to a class which will include the life
tenant, the life tenant is not necessarily excluded from the class which will take the
remainder: Diliman v. Dillman, 409 Il. 494, 100 N. E. (2d) 567 (1951).
(2) The word "heirs" is a technical word and is to be given its fixed legal
meaning even though the testator uses inconsistent words, unless such inconsistent
words are of such a nature as to make it perfectly clear that the word "heirs" was
not used in its proper and legal sense: Le Sourd v. Leinweber, 412 Ill. 100, 105
N. E. (2d) 722 (1952) ; Richardson v. Roney, 382 Ill. 528, 47 N. E. (2d) 714 (1943).
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testator plainly intended the contrary, thus making unnecessary
the application of the rules of construction relied on by the widow.
And in Williams v. Fulton,,77 the testator gave a quarter sec-
tion of land to his son for life with the remainder in fee to
the heirs of his body and if he (the son) should die without
descendants, then to the son's nearest of kin according to the
Illinois rules of descent. The phrase, "nearest of kin", prop-
erly and technically means "closest blood relatives" 8 whereas
the modifying clause referring to the Illinois rules of descent in-
cludes other than blood relatives, specifically, the surviving spouse.
Thus, upon the death of the son without descendants, the ques-
tion arose whether his widow was included or excluded from
the devise. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the widow
and in so doing was again obliged to place a non-technical con-
struction upon technical language. Justification for this position
was found in the qualifying clause making reference to the Illinois
rules of descent.
Though the decision in the case of In re Kent's Estate79 is
not surprising,0 it does serve to emphasize the rule that in this
state a spouse is not a competent attesting witness to the other
spouse's will. This is apparently the first time that the Illinois
courts have been faced with the precise question.
The question of who is an "interested person" 81 for the
purpose of bringing a will contest was before the Appellate Court
for the First District in Young v. Peloquin8 2 In this case, the
decedent's will was typewritten except for an interlineation which
specifically named the residuary beneficiary. Plaintiff's theory
was that fraud and undue influence were exerted by the named
beneficiary to secure his name and description in the will and
774 Ill. (2d) 524, 128 N. E. (2d) 495 (1954).
78 Hammond v. Myers, 292 Il1. 270. 126 N. E. 537 (1920). The rule was recognized
in Sloan v. Beatty. 1 Ill. (2d) 581, 116 N. E. (2d) 375 (1954).
794 11. (2d) 81. 122 N. E. (2d) 229 (11N54), noted in 33 CHIGAGo-KFXT LAW
REvIEw 283 and 19,55 Ill. L. Forum 182.
SO See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 8.
81 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955. Vol. 1. Ch. 3, § 242.
s26 Ill. App. (2d) 258, 127 N. E. (2d) 252 (1955).
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that if the interlineation was stricken together with the type-
written word, "fifteen", he, the plaintiff, would be the only per-
son who could answer the description of the residuary legatee
as it was intended to read. Even though the plaintiff was not
an heir of the decedent and the removal of the interlineation
could well have rendered the residuary clause void for indefinite-
ness, the court held that the plaintiff was an interested person
and could bring the action.
Turning to new legislation in the field, a search reveals some
important changes in the Probate Act. One such change 8 provides
that a testator may devise and bequeath property to 'a trustee
of an amendable and revocable trust in existence at the time
the will is executed. Henceforth, the pour-over will technique
is made more certain and convenient as it is no longer necessary
to repeat the terms of the trust in the will.
Another addition 4 provides for the acceleration of certain
future interests upon renunciation of the will by the surviving
spouse. Heretofore, the problem of acceleration had proved to
be a troublesome one for the courts and the law was by no means
settled, especially in the area of contingent remainders. This act
should remove some of the uncertainty.
The "anti-lapse" statute 5 has been amended so that those
legacies and devises which are not prevented from lapsing fall
into the residuary clause.86 Before this amendment, the dispo-
sition of lapsed legacies and devises depended upon the common
law rules and the testator's intent.
There is now a specific seven year limitation ST upon suits
brought against heirs or devisees by creditors under the frauds
and perjuries statute in Illinois.8 Heretofore, the general statute
83 Laws 1955. p.. H. B. No. 100; II. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1. Ch. 3. § 194a.
84 Laws 1955, p. H-, T. B. No. 2-3: Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 168a.
85 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 200.
86 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 71; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 200.
87 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 127: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955. Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 24d.
88 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 10 et seq.
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of limitation had governed the bringing of such actions. In a
sister act,"9 Section 15 of the frauds and perjuries statute was
repealed. This section provided that a separate suit may be
brought against the heirs or devisees on all undertakings by
the decedent if an estate had not been opened within one year
after death 0
Along the same line, an amendment"' to the Limitations Act
adds a new section imposing a specific limitation on actions to
enforce a contract to make a will. Such actions must be brought
within two years after the decedent's death or within the time
provided for the filing of claims if letters testamentary or of
administration have been applied for within the two year period.
Turning to the administration of estates, the General As-
sembly passed an act permitting a non-resident testator to select
the law of Illinois as the law governing the disposition of his
personal property if the situs of such property is in this state.2
In the absence of such a direction the law of the situs of personal
property would not ordinarily apply. Another act validates the
sale or mortgage of real property by an executor made pursuant
to a power of sale when the will containing the power is set aside.9
This, of course, is a codification of the general rule at com-
mon law. 4
Numerous other amendments were recently made to the Pro-
bate Act but no effort is made here to either discuss or record
them as their importance is of a limited nature.
(To be continued)
89 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. 126.
90 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 15.
91 Laws 1955, p. -, S. B. No. 127; I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 83, § 24e.
92 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 103; Ii. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 241b.
93 Laws 1955, p. -, H. B. No. 1092; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1965, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 400.
94 Smith v. Smith, 168 Ill. 488, 48 N. E. 96 (1897).
